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REMITTITURS (AND ADDITURS) 
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
AN EVALUATION WITH 
SUGGESTED 
ALTERNATIVES 
Irene Deaville Sann* 
The use of remittitur and additur in American jurisprudence is based upon Jus- 
tice Story's 'lery limits of the law" in conjunction with the constraints of the seventh 
amendment. Zkis author states that since additur is not presently being used as a 
procedural devise and remittitur Bpremised on the same principles, the current use of 
remittitur should be eliminated 
AT THE CONCLUSION of a jury trial in a federal court, after 
the jury has rendered its verdict, the parties are afforded an op- 
portunity to make post-trial motions.' Such motions often include 
a motion, by the verdict loser, for the entry of a judgment notwith- 
standing the verdictY2 or, in the alternative, for a new trial.3 The 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, White Plains, New 
York; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1977. The writer gratefully acknowledges 
the substantial efforts of her secretary, Judy Caporale, and the contributions of her research 
assistant, Catherine Allen. 
1 .  See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict); FED. 
R. CIV. P. 59(a), (b) & (c) (motion for a new trial); FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) (motion to alter or 
amend a judgment). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a) (motion for relief from judgment based 
on mistakes); FED. R. CIV. P. 60@) (motion for relief from judgment based on, inter alia, 
mistakes, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, and fraud. 
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). 
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a), (b) & (c). See ako FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (permitting joinder 
of a new trial motion with a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or with 
alternative motions); FED. R. CIV. P. 50(c)(1) (requiring the trial judge who grants a judg- 
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motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict4 is based on the 
losing party's contention that no "reasonable jury" could have 
found for the verdict winner on the strength of the evidence ad- 
duced at trial; thus, as a matter of law, the verdict should be re- 
versed through entry of a judgment favorable to the original loser.' 
Grounds for the new trial motion might include any of the follow- 
ing, singly or in combination: errors at trial,6 jury misconduct,' im- 
ment notwithstanding the verdict to also rule conditionally on any motion for a new trial); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(c)(2) (permitting a "party whose verdict has been set aside on a motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict" to serve a motion for a new trial). A party may 
also move for a partial new trial, by which the party seeks redetermination only as to a 
particular claim or a particular issue. FED. R. Crv. P. 59(a). 
A defendant who moves for a new trial on the ground that the jury award is excessive, see 
infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text may also move, in the alternative, for a remittitur. 
See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (describing the procedural device of remittitur); 
see, e.g., Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 615 F. Supp. 1546, 1547 @. Colo. 1985) (age 
discrimination action); Flores Caraballo v. Lopez, 601 F. Supp. 14, 15 (D.P.R. 1984) (civil 
rights action for damages from false arrest, unlawful search, and use of excessive force); 
Alaniz v. San Isidro Indep. School Dist., 589 F. Supp. 17, 19 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (civil rights 
action for wrongful discharge); Coburn v. Browning Arms Co., 565 F. Supp. 742, 744 (W.D. 
La. 1983) (products liability action); Rodgers v. Fisher Body Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 575 F. 
Supp. 12, 13 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (employment discrimination action); Walker v. KFC Corp., 
515 F. Supp. 612, 615 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (breach of fiduciary obligation and constructive trust 
action); Starlings v. Ski Roundtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507, 508 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (personal 
injury action); Washington v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1134, 1134 
(D.D.C. 1979) (personal injury action based on F.E.L.A.); Thornton v. Equifax, Inc., 467 F. 
Supp. 1008, 1009 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (state libel action and federal action under Fair Credit 
Reporting Act); Norfin, Inc. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 614, 615 @. 
Colo. 1979) (patent infringement action); United States v. 534.28 Acres of Land, 442 F. Supp. 
82, 83 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (condemnation action); Mullins v. Seals, 416 F. Supp. 1098, 1099 
(W.D. Va. 1976) (wrongful death action). In fact, in the great majority of cases in which a 
defendant moves for a new trial on the ground of excessive jury verdict, he combines that 
motion with an alternative motion for a remittitur. Even if the defendant does not move in 
the alternative for a remittitur, however, a trial court may grant such relief. See infra notes 
14-15 and accompanying text. 
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). 
5. See, e.g., Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) (overturning Missouri 
Supreme Court's reversal of jury verdict, since evidence was sufficient to support verdict); 
Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946). 
6. See, e.g., Westbrook v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(requiring new trial on issue of damages because trial judge allowed improper argument by 
plaintiff's counsel); Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(requiring new trial on issue of damages because trial judge allowed improper speculation as 
to decedent's future income); Jamison Co. v. Westvaco Corp., 530 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(requiring new trial because damages awarded plaintiff were excessive); Libco Corp. v. 
Dusek, No. 77 Civ. 4386 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 1986) (Lexis, Genfed Library, Dist. file) (plain- 
tiff's motion to revise the order granting a new trial was denied since the decision was not 
clearly erroneous or contrary to law and facts). 
7. See, e.g., United States v. Harry Barfield Co., 359 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1966) (revers- 
ing denial of new trial on ground that, during a recess, juror had engaged in a friendly conver- 
sation, unrelated tb trial, with plaintiff); Photostat Corp. v. Ball, 338 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 
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proper argument by opponent's coun~el ,~  admission of inadmissible 
e~idence,~ and a verdict which is against the substantial weight of 
the evidence.'' If the losing party is a defendant against whom the 
- - ~ -- ~p ~~p ~~~  
1964) (reversing denial of new trial on ground that juror's answers to voir dire question which 
they misunderstood led to harmful error because of inclusion on the jury of those jurors); 
Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 
(1947) (new trial on ground that jurors agreed to abide by majority votes because one juror 
wished to return home to deal with a family emergency). See generally Comment, Impeach- 
ment of Jury Verdicts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 360 (1958). 
8. See, eg., Westbrook v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(requiring new trial on issue of damages because trial judge allowed improper argument by 
plaintiff's counsel); Evers v. Equifax, Inc., 650 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming grant of 
new trial where plaintiff's counsel appealed to jury to award sufficient damages to prevent 
recurrence of errors on credit report); City of Cleveland v. Peter Kiewirt Sons', 624 F.2d 749 
(6th Cir. 1980) (granting new trial because of continued references by plaintiff's counsel to 
defendant's size and insurance coverage); Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. "Ming Giant," 
552 F. Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (setting aside verdict for plaintiff on grounds that plain- 
tiff's counsel tampered with evidence transmitted to deliberating jury, unless plaintiff agreed 
to remittitur). 
9. See, eg., Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. "Ming Giant," 552 F. Supp. 367 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (granting 
new trial on issue of damages where jury award was excessive and the product of passion and 
prejudice). 
10. See, ag., Altrichter v. Shell Oil Co., 263 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1959); Aetna Casualty & 
Sur. Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941); Balaska v. National Tea Co., 328 F. Supp. 
147 0V.D. Pa. 1971). When a federal district court judge is deciding whether to grant a new 
trial on the ground that the jury verdict is against the substantial weight of the evidence, he is 
permitted to make his own evaluation of the credibility and significance of the evidence ad- 
duced at trial. See, ag., Altrichter, 263 F.2d at 380. In making this decision, the judge acts 
like a thirteenth juror, a person present at trial who is capable of evaluating demeanor evi- 
dence and deciding whether the jury believed the wrong people. As stated by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: 
Where there is substantial evidence in support of plaintiff's case, the judge may not 
direct a verdict against hi, even though he may not believe his evidence or may 
think that the weight of the evidence is on the other side; for, under the constitu- 
tional guaranty of trial by jury, it is for the jury to weigh the evidence and pass upon 
its credibility. He may, however, set aside a verdict supported by substantial evi- 
dence where in his opinion it is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, or is 
based upon evidence which is false. . . . 
Garrison v. United States, 62 F.2d 41, 42 (4th Cir. 1932). 
The position stated by the Fourth Circuit-that a district court judge cannot reverse the 
jury by directing a verdict if he determines that, in his personal assessment, the jury verdict is 
against the weight of the evidence because such an action would constitute an unconstitu- 
tional reexamination of a "fact tried by a jury," U.S. C o ~ s r .  amend. VII-has been articu- 
lated and generally accepted by federal judges. See, ag., Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 
271 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J. concurring); Marsh v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 175 F.2d 498, 
499-500 (5th Cir. 1949). These courts feel that the judge's only option would be to grant a 
new trial of some or all of the issues in the w e  (pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure). Yet in 1880 the Supreme Court, in Bowditch V. Boston, announced a 
seemingly different conclusion: 
It is now a settled rule in the courts of the United States that whenever, in the trial 
of a civil w e ,  it is clear that the state of the evidence is such as not to warrant a 
verdict for a party, and that if such a verdict were rendered the other party would 
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jury has assessed money damages, the defendant might add exces- 
siveness of the jury verdict to his list of reasons for moving for a 
new trial." If the trial judge agrees that the jury verdict is exces- 
sive, he may order a whole new trial12 or a partial new trial limited 
to damage assessment  issue^.'^ Trial judges also utilize an alterna- 
tive method for dealing with some excessive verdicts-the trial 
judge calculates the amount of the verdict which he regards as ex- 
cessive and then orders a conditional new trial (on some or all is- 
sues), to be held if the plaintiff refuses to give up (remit) the amount 
of the jury verdict deemed by the trial judge to be excessive.14 This 
be entitled to a new trial, it is the right and duty of the judge to direct the jury to 
find according to the views of the court. 
- 
101 U.S. 16, 18 (1880). See generally, James, Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury Control 
Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REV. 218 (1961) (giving fuller treatment to this 
issue). The impact of the seventh amendment on the device of remittitur is discussed below. 
See infra notes 55-93 and accompanying text. 
A district court judge whose assessment of the evidence presented in a case runs contrary 
to that of the jury, as evidenced by its verdict, may grant a new trial on his own initiative, 
even though neither party has made a post-trial motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(d). Such grant 
of power reflects a federal attitude that rendering judgments consistent with the evidence 
adduced at a proper jury trial is more important than judicial economy. As noted below, 
such an attitude is not necessarily reflected by use of the remittitur procedure. See infra notes 
115, 119-20 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra note 32. 
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a). See, ag., Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. "Ming Giant," 
552 F. Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a). See, e.g., Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1, 3 
(E.D. Tenn. 1978). 
14. The subsequent disposition of the following cases is not cited as authority for the 
substantive issues in the text or footnotes, rather, the cases are meant to provide examples of 
the language used by trial courts. The language and procedures of conditional new trial 
orders rendered by federal trial courts vary in several regards. In some cases, the defendant's 
new trial motion is granted conditioned on the plaintiff's subsequent refusal to remit the 
excess. See, e.g., Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 563 F. Supp. 576, 585 (E.D. La. 1983) 
("me grant a new trial on this issue . . . unless plaintiff accepts a remittitur reducing the 
award to $250,00OW), rev'd on other grounds, 741 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1984); Huebschen v. 
Department of Health & Social Sews., 547 F. Supp. 1168, 1191 (W.D. Wis. 1982), ("IT IS 
FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion for a new trial is GRANTED . . . unless 
plaintiff agrees to accept $10,000 in compensatory damages and $15,000 in punitive dam- 
ages"), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983); Brink's Inc. v. City of New 
York, 546 F. Supp. 403, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("the motion for a new trial is granted unless 
the City agrees to a remittitur . . . ."), a r d ,  717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983); Morgan v. Consoli- 
dated Rail Corp., 509 F. Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("the $710,000 verdict is hereby set 
aside as to the amount of damages and a new trial granted Conrail on that issue unless . . . 
Morgan files . . . a remittitur of all damages in excess of $540,000 . . . ."); Uris v. Gurney's 
Inn Corp., 405 F. Supp. 744, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Defendant's motion for a new trial is 
granted . . . unless plaintiff . . . remits the amount of $200,000 . . . ."). 
Other courts reverse the language, ordering that the defendant's motion for a new trial be 
denied unless plaintiff refuses to remit. See, e.g., Anglo-American Gen. Agents v. Jackson 
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 83 F.R.D. 41, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1979) ("Defendant's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is denied, as is the motion for a new trial unless plaintiff declines 
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to remit $95,000 of the $100,000 award of punitive damages"). See also Smith v. City of 
Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458,466 (E.D. Tex. 1985) ("[ilt is.  . . ORDERED that defend- 
ants' Motion for New Trial be GRANTED on the following conditions: (1) If plaintiff agrees 
to a reduction in actual and punitive damages of $200,000.00, then defendants' motion will be 
DENIED . . ."). Other courts order entry of judgment in the remittitur-reduced amount, 
with the provision that such order be vacated and a new trial had if the plaintiff objects to 
entry of judgment in said amount. See, eg., United States v. 47.14 Acres of Land, 674 F.2d 
722,729 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[i]f . . . appellees consent to a remittitur of $169,934, the judgment 
will stand affirmed as of the date of judgment from which appeal was taken . . . [but] [i]n the 
absence of such remittitur, the district court will vacate its judgment and order a new trial"); 
Community Television Servs., v. Dresser Indus., 435 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D.S.D. 1977) ("[I]t 
will be ordered (1) that, i f .  . . plaintiff. . . shall serve . . . a remittitur in the sum of 
$1 10,370.01 upon the verdict found. . . the motion for a new trial be denied and the judgment 
confirmed for the remaining sum; but (2) that if such remittitur . . . be not so. . . filed. . ., the 
motion for a new trial be sustained, the judgment entered upon the verdict be vacated. . . and 
a new trial be granted"). See also Williams v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 430,432 
(E.D. Tenn. 1979) ("ORDERED . . . that a judgment in favor of Mr. Williams in the 
amount of $150,000.00 and a judgment in favor of Mrs. Williams in the amount of $5,000.00 
be awarded . . . [i]n the event of rejection, a new trial is granted"). Still other courts post- 
pone the matter of granting or denying a new trial motion, couching their orders in terms of 
the plaintiff's behavior. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if plaintiffs file a statement. . . accepting the 
remittitur of compensatory damages to $155,000 and of punitive damages to 
$10,000, defendants' motion for new trial shall be regarded as denied as of the date 
of such filing. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if no statement is filed by plaintiffs, the 
motion for new trial shall be regarded as granted as of the date of the expiration of 
the time period within which a statement could have been filed, and the Court will 
then set a new trial on the issue of damages only. 
Strathmere v. Karavas, 100 F.R.D. 478,479-80 (D. Ariz. 1984). See also Lux v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 608 F. Supp. 98, 106 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("Defendant's motion for a new trial 
will be denied if plaintiff agrees to remittitur of $1,000,000 . . . . Should plaintiff refuse 
remittitur, defendant's motion for a new trial will be granted"), rev'd 803 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
The period of time within which the plaintiff who wishes to avoid a new trial must act on 
the remittitur order varies, with time periods of ten (10) days (the shortest period for a trial 
court's original order), see, ag., Strathmere v. Karavas, 100 F.R.D. 478,479 @. Ariz. 1984); 
Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 563 F. Supp. 576, 585 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'd on other 
grounds, 741 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1984); Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social Servs., 
547 F. Supp. 1168, 1191 (W.D. Wis. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 
1983); Brinks Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F. Supp. 403, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 717 
F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983); Gaston v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 487 F. Supp. 16, 19 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1980); fifteen (15) days, see, eg., Holman v. Mark Indus., 610 F. Supp. 1 195, 1206 @. 
Md. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1986); Dixon v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 490 F. 
Supp. 1191, 1200 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980), cerf. denied, 454 U.S. 
838 (1981); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568,579 (D. Md. 1975); twenty (20) 
days, see, eg., Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 577 F. Supp. 318, 336 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on 
othergrounds, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 182 (1986); Akermanis v. 
Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 44,59 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 688 F.2d 
898 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984); 
Morgan v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 509 F. Supp. 281,288 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Collins v. Retail 
Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924,936 (E.D. Mich. 1976); and thirty (30) days, see, eg., Douglass 
v. Hustler Magazine, 607 F. Supp. 816, 822 (N.D. 111. 1984), rev'd on othergrounds, 769 F.2d 
1128 (7th Cir. 1985); Plattner v. Strick Corp., 102 F.R.D 612, 619 (N.D. 111. 1984); Lux v. 
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procedural device is called a remittitur.15 If the plaintiff refuses to 
remit, the case is submitted to a new jury without further action by 
p~~- - p~ p~ p~ -~ 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 608 F. Supp. 98, 106 (N.D. 111. 1984), rev'd on othergrounds, 803 
F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1986); Dick v. Watonwan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083, 1110 @. Minn. 
1983), rev'd on othergrounds, 738 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1984); Jeanneret v. Vichey, 541 F. Supp. 
80, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Community Television Servs. v. Dresser Indus., 435 F. Supp. 214, 
218 (D.S.D. 1977); Uris v. Gurney's Inn Corp., 405 F. Supp. 744,747 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), being 
the standard time periods permitted. At least one court has given the plaintiff slightly more 
than thirty days to respond, Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458,466 (E.D. Tex. 
1985), while upon denial of a plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of a remittitur order, the 
plaintiff was given only seven (7) days to respond. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 577 F. Supp. 
318, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1985). It is clear 
that, in some jurisdictions, such as the Southern District of New York, no single time period 
is prescribed by court rules; the period allotted must depend upon the judge and the factual 
circumstances of the case. 
If the defendant has specifically requested a remittitur as alternative relief to a new trial, 
the court might rule separately on the specific remittitur request. See, ag., Holman v. Mark 
Indus., 610 F. Supp. 1195, 1206 @. Md. 1985), a p d ,  796 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1986) ("OR- 
DERED. . . [tlhat the motion of defendant Patuxent Equipment Company for a partial new 
trial on damages or for a remittitur, be. . . granted."); Hodges v. Keystone Shipping Co.. 578 
F. Supp. 620,625 (S.D. Tex. 1983) ("it is. . . ORDERED. . . that defendants' motion. . . for 
remittitur or new trial is. . . GRANTED as to compensatory damages unless plaintiff accepts 
remittitur of the compensatory damages to $12,500."); Gaston v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 
487 F. Supp. 16,19 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) ("The Court. . . grants a remittitur of $250,000. . .; 
[tlhe plaintiff shall have 10 days in which to accept. . . and if he fails to accept, a new trial is 
granted."). See also supra note 3. 
The language quoted below is an example of a plaintiff's written acceptance of a remitti- 
tur order: 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, LEWIS LEON HODGES, and, pursuant to the Court's 
Memorandum and Order dated October 4, 1983, agrees to accept the remittitur of 
compensatory damages to $12,500.00 expressly reserving any rights he may have to 
object to this remittitur on appeal. In light of his acceptance of this remittitur, 
Plaintiff moves that judgment in this case be made final. 
Hodges, 578 F. Supp. at 625. 
15. See, e.g., Busch, Remittiturs and Additurs in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death 
Cases, 12 DEF. L.J. 521 (1963); Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L. REV. 1 
(1942); James, Remedies for Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Verdicts, 1 DUQ. L. REV. 143 
(1963); Note, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 299 (1976) [here- 
inafter Note, Remittitur Practice]; Comment,.Additur and Remittitur in Federal and State 
Courts: An Anomaly?, 3 CUM. L. REV. 150 (1972) [hereinafter Comment, Additur and Re- 
mittitur]; Note, Appealability of Judgments Entered Pursuant to Remittiturs in Federal 
Courts, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1150 [hereinafter Note, Appealability of Judgments]; Comment, Stat- 
utory Authorization of Additur and Remittitur, 43 MISS. L.J. 107 (1972) [hereinafter Com- 
ment, Statutory Authorization]; Comment, Appellate Remittitur, 33 Mo. L. REV. 637 (1968); 
Comment, Remittitur Review: Constitutionality and Emency  in Liquidated and Unliqui- 
dated Damage Cases, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 376 (1976) [hereinafter Comment, Remittitur Re- 
view]; Note, Constitutional Law-Right to Jury Trial- Judicial Use of Additurs in Correcting 
Insufficient Damage Verdicts, 21 VA. L. REV. 666 (1935) [hereinafter Note, Constitutional 
Law]; Note, Procedures to Lessen Remittitur's Intrusion on the Seventh Amendment Right to 
Jury Trial, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 639 [hereinafter Note, Procedures to Lessen Remittitur's In- 
trusion]; Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts by Remittitur and Additur, 44 YALE L.J. 
318 (1934) [hereinafter Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts]. 
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the trial court.16 If the plaintiff remits, the remittitur-reduced ver- 
dict is entered, and the defendant does not get his new trial." 
Under current practice, the remitting plaintiff cannot then appeal 
the conditional new trial order.18 
This conditional new trial device-remittitur-has been em- 
ployed by state19 as well as federalz0 trial courts (and, in some cir- 
cumstances, appellate courtsz1) for more than one hundred years,22 
and the use of remittitur has increased continuously to the present 
day.23 While the related conditional new trial device of additur- 
grant of plaintiff's motion for a new trial conditioned on the defend- 
ant's refusal to increase the jury verdict by the amount the trial 
judge deems necessary to cure an inadequate verdictz4-is employed 
16. See supra notes 1415. 
17. See supra notes 14-15. 
18. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text. 
19. See, ag., State v. Ferguson, 269 Ala. 44, 110 So. 2d 280 (1959); Grant v. Thomas, 
254 Iowa 581, 118 N.W.2d 545 (1962); Slocum v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 190 Kan. 747, 
378 P.2d 51 (1963); Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie R.R. Co., 244 
Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955); Whitten v. Land, 188 So. 2d 246 (Miss. 1966); Jackson v. 
Southwestern Pub. Sew. Co., 66 N.M. 458,349 P.2d 1029 (1960); Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
10 Wis.2d 78, 102 N.W.2d 393 (Wis. 1960). 
20. See, eg., Holman v. Mark Indus., 610 F. Supp. 1195 @. Md. 1985); Smith v. City of 
Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Tex. 1985); Lux v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 608 F. 
Supp. 98 (N.D. 111. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 803 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1986); Douglas v. 
Hustler Magazine, 607 E Supp. 816 (N.D. Ill. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 1128 
(1985); Korotki v. Goughan, 597 E Supp. 1365 @. Md. 1984); Hodges v. Keystone Shipping 
Co., 578 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Gaston v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 487 F. Supp. 16 
(E.D. Tenn. 1980); Fratelii Gardino, S.P.A. v. Carribean Lumber Co., 447 F. Supp. 1337 
(S.D. Ga. 1978); Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1976). See also 
infra note 31. 
21. See, ag., Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1985); K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss 
Int'l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148 (10th Cir. 1985); Martell v. Boardwalk Enter., 748 F.2d 740 (2d 
Cir. 1984); Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979). See also infra notes 
149-62 and accompanying text. 
22. See, ag., Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917); Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 
397 (1896); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41 (1895); Clark v. 
Sidway, 142 U.S. 682 (1892); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889); Arkansas Valley Land 
& Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 
(1886); Eaton v. Jones, 107 Cal. 487,40 P. 798 (1895); Johnson v. Duncan, 16 S.E. 88 (Ga. 
1892); Young v. Englehard & Silverberg, 2 Miss. 19 (1834); McAlister v. Mullanphy, 3 Mo. 
25 (1831); Fry v. Stowers, 36 S.E. 482 (Va. 1900). The historical development of the remitti- 
tur device is discussed below. See infra notes 51-93 and accompanying text. 
23. See, eg., James, supra note 15, at 146 & n.16. 
24. See, cg., Busch, supra note 15, at 551-58; Carlin, supra note 15, at 1-2; James, supra 
note 15, at 145-46; Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 299 n.2; Comment, Additur 
and Remittitur, supra note 15, at 153-55; Comment, Statutory Authorization, supra note 15, at 
110-19; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at 666-67; Comment, Correction of Damage 
Verdicts, supra note 15, at 322-26. 
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by some state courts,25 federal courts are prohibited from using ad- 
ditur because the Supreme Court has ruled26 that the procedure vio- 
lates the seventh amendment of the Con~titution.~' Upon careful 
examination, the virtues extolled in support of these conditional 
new trial devices are generally reduced to economies of time, the 
parties and the judicial system, and money.28 Trial judges usually 
assert that if the only error in a jury verdict is the jury's excessive 
generosity (in remittitur cases) or penuriousness (in additur cases), 
the time, effort and money that went into getting that original jury 
verdict could be saved by these simple devices.29 
25. See, e.g., Jehl v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821,427 P.2d 988, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276 
(1967); James v. Morey, 44 111. 352 (1867); Carr v. Miner, 42 Ill. 179 (1866); Marsh v. 
Kendall, 65 Kan. 48,68 P. 1070 (1902); Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527,80 N.W.2d 854 
(1957); Stahlheber v. American Cyanamid Co., 451 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1970); Fisch v. Manger, 
24 N.J. 66, 130 A.2d 815 (1957); O'Connor v. Papertsian, 309 N.Y. 465, 131 N.E.2d 883 
(1956); Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42,327 P.2d 826 (1958); Claising v. Kershaw, 224 P. 
573, 129 Wash. 67 (1924). 
26. Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). See also infra notes 56-93 and accompany- 
ing text. 
27. See infro notes 56-93 and accompanying text. 
28. See, ag., Carlin, supra note 15, at  3-4 ("[tlhe desirability of [remittitur's] use, to 
avoid the expense, delay and prolongation of litigation incident to a new trial, would seem to 
be beyond controversy"); Comment, Additur and Remittitur, supra note 15, at 160 
("[rlemittitur and additur have developed through the years to help alleviate the situation of 
crowded dockets brought about by the necessity of new trials on the issue of excessive or 
inadequate jury awards"); Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts, supra note 15, at 318 
("efficiency of judicial administration is hampered by the granting of new trials, with their 
concomitant delays in final adjudication and increased costs to litigants"). Clearly, with an 
overburdened judicial system, avoidance of unnecessary new trials is a desirable goal. How- 
ever, current remittitur practice is not the fairest method for achieving this goal, and this 
Article suggests alternative methods for reducing the potential for excessive verdicts without 
acting on such verdicts. See infra notes 166-263 and accompanying text. 
29. See, Lewis v. Elliott, 628 F. Supp. 512, 524 (D.D.C. 1986) (court orders new trial 
conditioned on plaintiff's refusal to remit part of compensatory damages, stating, "[tlhe 
Court concludes that the jury's damage award exceeded the maximum limit . . . [and] 
[alccordingly, a remittitur is appropriate. . . ."); Holman v. Mark Indus., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 
1195, 1206 @. Md. 1985) (court orders new trial conditioned on plaintiff's refusal to remit 
part of compensatory damages and damages for loss of consortium, stating, "[tlhe principle 
of remittitur is ancillary to the right of a trial judge to grant a new trial, and a remittitur may 
be assessed in an amount that will bring the verdict on damages to the maximum amount 
which the jury could have awarded under the evidence introduced at trial"); Douglass v. 
Hustler Magazine, 607 F. Supp. 816, 821-22 (N.D. 111. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 769 
F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985) (court orders new trial conditioned on plaintiff's refusal to remit 
part of award of punitive damages, stating, "$1,500,000 in punitive damages . . . far exceeds 
the necessary and permissible level . . .[;I $100,000. . . is a reasonable amount . . . [and] [tlhe 
Court . . . will grant Hustler's motion for a new trial unless Douglass agrees to remittitur . 
. . ."); Hodges v. Keystone Shipping Co., 578 F. Supp. 620, 624 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (court 
orders new trial conditioned on plaintiff's refusal to remit part of award of compensatory 
damages, stating, "[wlhen a motion for new trial is premised on the issue of excessive dam- 
ages, the court may, if the verdict is not judged to have been the result of the jury's passion or 
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Although the frequency of use of these devices varies from juris- 
diction to jur isdi~t ion,~~ the remittitur device has been and contin- 
ues to be employed in every federal circuity3' and most state courts 
prejudice, offer the plaintiff the options of new trial or remittitur"); Alley v. Gubser Dev. Co., 
569 F. Supp. 36, 40-41 @. Colo. 1983) (court orders new trial conditioned on plaintiff's 
refusal to remit part of award of punitive damages, stating, "[hlad the entire trial been tainted 
b y  jury passion or prejudice], the Court would have no choice but to order a new trial . . .[,I 
but finding no defect in the liability determination], the Court will order a remittitur . . . ."), 
rev'd, 785 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir. 1986) (on ground that district court erred in denying 
defendants' motions for a directed verdict on issue of punitive damages and in submitting this 
issue to the jury); Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 
64, 103 @.S.C 1979) (court orders new trial conditioned on plaintiff's refusal to remit part of 
award of actual damages, stating, "[tlhe practice of remittitur . . . allows a court to condition 
denial of a motion for a new trial upon plaint8filmg a remittitur in a stated amount"); Jehl v. 
S. Pac. Co., 427 P.2d 988,994-95,59 Cal. Rptr. 276,282-83 (1967) (court adopts additur as a 
method for achieving "economy and efficiency in judicial proceedings" by which trial court 
can order new trial conditioned on defendant's refusal to increase the jury verdict to a court- 
fixed amount); Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854 (1957) (court adopts 
additur); O'Connor v. Papertsian, 309 N.Y. 465, 131 N.E.2d 883 (1956) (court adopts ad- 
ditur); Caudle v. Swanson, 248 N.C. 249, 103 S.E.2d 357 (1958) (court adopts additur). The 
issue of jury passion or prejudice as affecting a court's decision to grant a remittitur will be 
discussed below. See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. 
Other courts make conditional new trial orders without discussing the benefits or bases of 
these orders. See, eg.,  Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458,466 (E.D. Tex. 1985) 
(court finds actual damage award "could not have exceeded $50,000.00" and then, without 
discussion of the hasis for, or the propriety of remittitur, orders a new trial conditioned on 
plaintiff's refusal to remit); Lux v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 608 F. Supp. 98, 105 (N.D. Ill. 
1984) (court finds compensatory damage award excessive and, after stating "that a remittitur 
of $1,000,000 is appropriate," enters a conditional new trial order), rev'd, 803 F.2d 304 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (on grounds that evidence of decedent's income tax liability was not allowed by 
district court and would have altered size of pecuniary damage amount awarded by jury); 
Gaston v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 487 F. Supp. 16, 19 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (court finds 
amount of compensatory damages over $1,000,000 to be excessive and, without further dis- 
cussion, "grants a remittitur of $250,000, which will reduce the verdict to $1,000,000"). 
30. See infra notes 101-21 and accompanying text. Some federal jurisdictions have less 
rigorous requirements than do other jurisdictions for use of remittitur. Moreover, some fed- 
eral circuits, such as the Second and Fifth Circuits, decide many more cases involving remit- 
titur requests or orders than do other circuits, such as the First, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. 
See infra note 31. The additur device is not employed by federal courts. See infra notes 56- 
93 and accompanying text. 
Most states employ remittitur to some extent, but not all states employ additur. See gen- 
eral&, Busch, supra note 15; Carlin, supra note 15; Comment, Statutory Authorization, supra 
note 15; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15; Comment, Correction ofDamage Verdicts, 
supra note 15. 
31. First Circuit: See, eg., Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1982); Fact 
Concerts, Inc. v. City of Newport, 626 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1980). 
Second Circuit: See, cg., Martell v. Boardwalk Enter., 748 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1984); 
Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, 682 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1982); Evans v. Calmar S.S. Co., 534 F.2d 
519 (2d Cir. 1976); Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), 
a r d ,  717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983); Jeanneret v. Vichey, 541 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), 
rev'd on othergrounds, 693 F.2d 259 (2d. Cir. 1982); Morgan v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 509 
F. Supp. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Dixon v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 490 F. Supp. 1191 
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use one or both devices.32 Moreover, the versatility of the devices is 
demonstrated by the wide variety of cases in which they have been 
used, including tort cases,33 contract cases,34 civil rights actionsY3' 
nied, 106 S. Ct. 233 (1985); Smith v. UpdegrafF, 744 F.2d 1354 (8th Cir. 1984); Vanskike v. 
Union Pac. R.R, 725 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1984): Ouachita Nat'l Bank v. Tosco Corp., 716 
F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1983); Everett v. S.H. Parks & Assocs., 697 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1983); 
Central Microfilm Serv. v. Basicflour Corp., 688 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1206 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1704 (1983); United States v. 47.14 Acres of Land, 
674 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1982); Stineman v. Fontbonne College, 664 F.2d 1082 (8th Ci. 1981); 
Amott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980); 
Kropp v. Ziebarth, 601 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1979); Richardson v. Communications Workers 
of Am., 530 F.2d 126 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); Bankers Life & Casualty v. 
Kirtley, 307 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1962); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. 
Mo. 1983), modifed, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Ci. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986); Dick 
v. Watonwan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083 @. Minn. 1983), rev'd on othergrounds, 738 F.2d 
939 (8th Cir. 1984); Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec., 508 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Mo. 1980), a r d ,  
669 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983). 
Ninth Circuit: See, eg., 999 v. C.I.T. Corp., 776 E2d 866 (9th Cir. 1985). C j  Walker v. 
KFC Corp., 515 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (trial court refuses to grant remittitur), modi- 
fied, 728 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1984); Parker v. Shonfeld, 409 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Cal. 1976) 
(trial court refuses to grant remittitur). 
Tenth Circuit: See, eg., K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148 (10th Cir. 
1985); Alley v. Gubser Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36 @. Colo. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 785 
F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1986). Cf: Frank v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir. 1980) (court refuses 
to grant remittitur); Brown v. Skaggs-Albertson's Properties, 563 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1977) 
(court refuses to grant remittitur); Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 615 F. Supp. 1546 @. 
Colo. 1985) (court refuses to grant remittitur). 
Eleventh Circuit: See, eg., Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821 (llth Cir. 
1985); T.D.S., Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520 (1 lth Cir. 1985); Wilson v. Taylor, 
733 F.2d 1539 (llth Cir. 1984); Dempsey v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 717 F.2d 556 (llth Cir. 
1983); Itel Capital Corp. v. Cups Coal Co., 707 F.2d 1253 (llth Cir. 1983); Warren v. Ford 
Motor Credit Co., 693 F.2d 1373 (llth Cir. 1982). 
District of Columbia Circuit: See Clark v. World Airways, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 305,24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 31,385 at 18,292 @.D.C. Oct. 24, 1980) (motion 
for remittitur denied); Washington v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1134 
P.D.C. 1979) (court refuses to grant remittitur). 
32. See supra note 19. See generally, Busch, supra note 15; Carlin, supra note 15; Com- 
ment, Additur and Remittitur, supra note 15; Comment, Statutory Authorization, supra note 
15; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15; Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts, supra 
note 15. 
33. See, eg., Walters v. MintecAnt'l, 758 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1985) (wrongful death action 
by survivors of decedent killed in accident at place of employment); Hansen v. Johns- 
Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984) (wrongful death action by survivors of 
decedent who allegedly died from employment-related exposure to asbestos products); 
Holman v. Mark Indus., 610 F. Supp. 1195 @. Md. 1985) (personal injury and loss of con- 
sortium suit arising from accident at place of employment), a p d ;  796 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 
1986); Faulkner v. Western Elec. Co., 98 F.R.D. 282 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (action for physical 
and emotional injuries allegedly sustained because of a neck injury); Starlings v. Ski 
Roundtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (personal injury action arising from 
skiing accident); Uris v. Gurney's Inn. Corp., 405 F. Supp. 744 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (personal 
injury and loss of consortium action arising from dune buggy accident). 
34. See, cg., Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081 (7th cir. 1978) (action for 
fraud and breach of express and implied warranties against housing contractor); Geyer v. 
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eminent domain  proceeding^,^^ and antitrust  action^.^' Basically, 
any jury trial at which money damages can be awarded is a poten- 
tial candidate for a conditional new trial order. 
Enthusiastic adoption of remittitur, however, has not com- 
pletely dispelled doubts about the constitutionality of its use by the 
federal courts.38 Moreover, many corn men tat or^^^ question 
whether the distinctions drawn by the Supreme Court between re- 
mittitur (as constitutional) and additur (as unconstitutional) are re- 
ally sound in historical as well as practical terms.40 Some believe 
Vargas Prods., 627 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1980) (action for breach of employment contract); 
Plattner v. Strick Corp., 102 F.R.D. 612 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (action for breach of warranty in 
sale of flat-bed truck); Jeanneret v. Vichey, 541 E Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other 
grounds, 693 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1982) (action for breach of contract and breach of implied 
warranty of title in sale of painting); Marder v. Conwed Corp., 75 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1977) 
(action for wrongful termination of oral employment contract); Keystone Floor Prods. Co. v. 
Beattie Mfg., 432 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (action for breach of distributorship agree- 
ment); Meyer v. W.R. Grace & Co., 421 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (action for breach of 
employment contract). 
35. Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1985) (civil rights action against city and 
former mayor for damages arising from arrest of plaintiffs); Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 
F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1985) (civil rights action against city for damages arising from strip 
search of plaintiff); Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (civil 
rights action against city and police officers for injuries sustained in engagement with police 
when plaintiff's automobile was stopped by police to determine whether plaintiff was intoxi- 
cated); Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social Servs., 547 F. Supp. 1168 (W.D. Wisc. 
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983) (civil rights action for sexual 
harassment of plaintiff in his place of employment); Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 508 
F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Mo. 1980), a f d ,  669 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080 
(1982) (civil rights action for age discrimination in employment). 
36. See United States v. 47.14 Acres of Land, 674 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1982) (action for 
just compensation in eminent domain case). 
37. See, e.g., Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1009 (D.N.J. 
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 570 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir. 1977) (antitrust action by automobile 
dealers against automobile manufacturer and some of its wholly owned subsidiaries), cert. 
denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1972) 
(antitrust suit brought by independent automobile dealer and its major stockholders against 
automobile manufacturer), rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 868 (1974). 
38. See infra notes 51-93 and accompanying text. 
39. See, e.g., Carlin, supra note 15, at 29 (The functional application of additur and 
remittitur rests upon the distinction between what the jury "may" award and what "ought" 
to be awarded. Use of the term "may" allows some element of discretion to be exercised by 
the judge.); Comment, Additur and Remittitur, supra note 15, at 163 (No credible rationale 
exists for the general acceptability of remittitur while the equally effective additur has been 
roundly dismissed.); Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at 673-74 (distinction between 
remittitur and additur is unsound in view of the laudable ends served by the application of 
each); Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts, supra note 15, at 324 (argument that use of 
additur should be declared constitutional despite possible seventh amendment problems). 
40. See infra notes 56-93 and accompanying text. 
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that both procedures should be endorsed and utilized:' while 
others question the constitutionality of either.42 Finally, some com- 
mentators question whether any benefits provided by the condi- 
tional new trial procedures are not outweighed by considerations in 
other than potential constitutional conflict.43 
The purpose of this Article is to explore the efficacy and consti- 
tutionality of the remittitur device,44 with some consideration of 
whether additur should be included in the already extensive arsenal 
of the federal trial judge.45 Discussion will focus almost exclusively 
on the federal courts because state courts do not face the chimera of 
seventh amendment limitations on reexaminations of jury ver- 
d i c t ~ . ~ ~  The evaluation will include not only examination of trial 
court remittitur practice:' but also the effects of its use by appellate 
Finally, the Article will suggest alternative methods49 
which might achieve some of the asserted benefits of the conditional 
new trial device absent some of the unfairness and inefficiency, as 
well as the usurpation of the jury function, which are currently em- 
ployed in the device.50 
11. DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF CONDITIONAL 
NEW TRIAL ORDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Historical Development 
Authorities agree that the use in the United States federal courts 
of the remittitur procedure was initiated by Mr. Justice Story, while 
sitting on circuit, in the case of Blunt v. Little.51 In a single para- 
graph devoted to the issue of excessive damages, in which the sole 
~ -- 
41. See, eg., Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at 673-74; Comment, Correction 
of Damage Verdicts, supra note 15, at 324. 
42. See, eg., Carlin, supra note 15, at 36-37. 
43. Seegenerally Busch, supra note 15. See also infra notes 166-247 and accompanying 
text. 
44. See infra notes 166-247 and accompanying text. 
45. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 248. 
46. See itzfra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
47. See infra notes 94-148 and accompanying text. 
48. See infra notes 149-64 and accompanying text. 
49. See infra notes 248-63 and accompanying text. 
50. See infra notes 166-247 and accompanying text. 
51. 3 F. Cas. 760, 762 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1,578). See, e.g., Dimick v. Scheidt, 
293 U.S. 474,482 (1935); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 646-47 (1885); Note 
Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 300-01; Comment, Additur and Remittitur, supra note 
15, at 151-52; Note, Appealability of Judgments, supra note 15, at 1158 n.61; Comment, Stat- 
utory Authorization, supra note 15, at 107-08; Comment, Remittitur Review, supra note 15, at 
376 n.1; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at 667; Note, Procedures to Lessen Remitti- 
fur's Intrusion, supra note 15, at 642-43. 
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authorities cited were two English cases upholding a judge's author- 
ity to grant a new trial on the grounds of excessiveness of the jury 
verdict, Justice Story approved of and used the remittitur device.52 
I have the greatest hesitation in interfering with the verdict, 
and in so doing, I believe that I go to the very limits of the law. 
After full reflection, I am of opinion, that it is reasonable, that 
the cause should be submitted to another jury, unless the plaintiff 
is willing to remit $500 of his damages. If he does, the court 
ought not to interfere further.53 
Although referring to "the very limits of the law," Justice Story did 
not mention the possible source of such limits, that is the seventh 
amendment of the Constitution, which proscribes any reexamina- 
tion of a "fact tried by a jury9'-in remittitur cases, the jury's assess- 
ment of the proper amount of damages-"otherwise . . . than 
according to the rules of the common law."54 
In only a handful of cases55 has the United States Supreme 
52. 3 F. Cas. at 761-62. 
53. 3 F. Cas. at 762 (emphasis added). 
54. See infra note 58. 
55. See Donovan v. Penn Shipping, 429 U.S. 648 (1977) (question whether a plaintiff 
may appeal from a remittitur order which he has accepted); Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 
77 (1955) (question whether, on the records of this case, district court's denial of a new trial 
upon plaintiff's remitting excessive part of verdict should have been disturbed by the court of 
appeals); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) (question whether a federal court could 
constitutionally employ the additur procedure; dictum as to possible unconstitutionality of 
the remittitur procedure); Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917) (question whether 
plaintiff who had accepted an appellate remittitur could appeal the remittitur order); Gila 
Valley, G & N Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94 (1914) (question whether the large amount remitted 
in an unliquidated damage case established passion or prejudice on the part of the jury, thus 
requiring a new trial rather than remittitur); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307 
(191 1) (did not directly address remittitur practice but tacitly approved use of appellate re- 
mittitur); Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397 (1896) (question whether, upon finding that a lower 
court judgment was valid except for certain damages awarded because of improper jury in- 
struction, the Court could order remittitur); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 
158 U.S. 41 (1895) (question whether plaintiff who had accepted an appellate remittitur order 
could appeal the remittitur order); Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U.S. 551 (1894) (question whether a 
plaintiff who had accepted a remittitur under a new trial-remittitur order, made at a time 
when the trial judge could no longer grant a new trial, could appeal the rernittitur order more 
than two years after his acceptance of the order); Clark v. Sidway, 142 U.S. 682 (1892) (ques- 
tion whether order of remittitur was appropriate); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889) 
(question whether a federal appellate court could enter judgment absolutely, for an amount 
less than that awarded by the jury, without the plaintiff's agreement); Arkansas Valley Land 
& Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889) (question whether remittitur denied the defendant 
his rights under the seventh amendment); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 
(1885) (question whether it was error for a trial court to order a new trial unless the plaintiff 
agreed to remit the amount the court determined to be excessive). See also Fairmount Glass 
Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474 (1933) (question whether Supreme Court would 
review appellate court's grant of a new trial when such grant was conditioned on the parties 
not agreeing to entry of an increased verdict); Minneapolis, St. P & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Moquin, 
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Court dealt with issues relating to the question of federal court new 
trial orders conditioned on a party's refusal to accept a court-re- 
duced or court-increased verdict-remittitur or additur. Its most 
famous (and most direct) decision involving these procedures was 
Dimick v. S ~ h i e d t , ~ ~  a 1935 opinion in which the Court, per Mr. 
Justice Sutherland, in a 5-4 decision," concluded that additur could 
not be utilized by federal courts because the procedure involved an 
unconstitutional reexamination of a jury verdict in violation of the 
283 U.S. 520 (1931) (question whether a state court in a F.E.L.A. action, could use remittitur 
to cure an excessive verdict where the excessiveness of the verdict was a product of passion 
and prejudice). 
56. 293 U.S. 474 (1935). Arguably, in other cases, the Supreme Court implicitly or 
explicitly approved the remittitur procedure. See supra note 51. Those cases, however, in- 
cluded little or no analysis. For example, the earliest case in which the Supreme Court ap- 
proved remittitur, Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 (1886), included only the 
following discussion of the issue: 
The exaction, as a condition of refusing a new trial, that the plaintiff should 
remit a portion of the amount awarded by the verdict was a matter within the 
discretion of the court. I t  held that the amount found was excessive, but that no 
error had been committed on the trial. In requiring the remission of what was 
deemed excessive it did nothing more than require the relinquishment of so much of 
the damages as, in its opinion, the jury had improperly awarded. The corrected 
verdict could, therefore, be properly allowed to stand. Hayden v. The Florence Sew- 
ing Machine Co., 54 N.Y. 221, 225 (1873); Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208, 213 193 
Am. Dec. 80, 87 (1867); Blunt v. Little, 3 Mason, 102, 107. 
116 U.S. at 646-47 (emphasis in original). This language, which is conclusory and which, for 
support, relies on two state court cases and one federal circuit court case (decided by Mr. 
Justice Story while sitting on circuit), is often cited for the proposition that the Supreme 
Court had approved remittitur at  an early date. See, eg., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 
483 (1935); Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69,73 (1889). The only 
case before Dirnick in which the Court addressed the seventh amendment issue was Arkansas 
Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 72 (1889). See infra note 58. The Court's 
assessment of the defendant's allegation that the remittitur "is in effect a re-examination by 
the court, in a mode not known at the common law, of facts tried by the jury," 130 U.S. at 72, 
consisted of the following analysis: 
The practice which this court approved in Northern Pacific Railroad v. Herbert 
is sustained by sound reason, and does not, in any just sense, impair the constitu- 
tional right of trial by jury. I t  cannot be disputed that the court is within the limits 
of its authority when it sets aside the verdict of the jury and grants a new trial where 
the damages are palpably or outrageously excessive. But, in considering whether a 
new trial should be granted upon that ground, the court necessarily determines, in 
its own mind, whether a verdict for a given amount would be liable to the objection 
that it was excessive. The authority of the court to determine whether the damages 
are excessive implies authority to determine when they are not of that character. 
To indicate, before passing upon the motion for a new trial, its opinion that the 
damages are excessive, and to require a plaintiff to submit to a new trial, unless, by 
remitting a part of the verdict, he removes that objection, certainly does not deprive 
the defendant of any right, or give him any cause for complaint. 
Id. at 74 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
57. Justices Butler, McReynolds, Roberts, and Van Devanter joined Mr. Justice Suther- 
land in the majority opinion. Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Brandeis and Cardozo joined 
in a dissent written by Mr. Justice Stone. 
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seventh amendment.58 After a review of what it considered to be 
relevant historical data, the only review of such materials conducted 
by the Supreme Court in regard to the question of the constitution- 
ality of remittitur, the Court concluded:59 
In the last analysis, the sole support for the decisions of this 
court . . . , as far as they are pertinent to cases like that now in 
hand, must rest upon the practice of some of the English 
judges-a practice which has been condemned as opposed to the 
principles of the common law by every reasoned English deci- 
sion, both before and after the adoption of the Federal Constitu- 
tion, which we have been able to find. 
In the next paragraph, in rather startling dictum, the Court went on 
to note:60 
In the light reflected by the foregoing review of the English deci- 
sions and commentators, it, therefore, may be that if the question 
of remittitur were now before us for the first time, it would be 
58. 293 U.S. at  486. The seventh amendment provides: 
In suits at  common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of the common law. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. While sometimes misinterpreted as prohibiting any reexamination 
of a fact tried by a jury, the generally accepted interpretation of the seventh amendment is 
that (1) it requires federal courts to afford jury trials in circumstances in which such trials 
would have been available in England at the time of the adoption of the seventh amendment 
in 1791, and (2) it forbids federal courts from reexamining the fact-finding of a jury, except as 
such reexamination would have been available in England at the time of the adoption of the 
seventh amendment. See, e.g., 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO- 
CEDURE: CIVIL $ 2303 (1971); Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amend- 
ment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973). The additur and remittitur procedures compromise the 
seventh amendment proscription against unlimited reexaminations of facts found by a jury. 
When a trial judge (or, possibly, an appellate judge) concludes that the jury verdict is exces- 
sive (or inadequate) by $X, one must necessarily ask whether the judge's action in condition- 
ing a new trial order on the plaintiff's refusal to agree to accept a verdict of Sf less than the 
jury awarded (or on the defendant's refusal to agree to increase the verdict to $X more than 
the jury awarded) involves such a prohibited reexamination of a fact found by a jury (the 
amount of damages to which the recovering party is entitled). In effect, the trial judge (or 
appellate judge) is substituting his own evaluation of the appropriate quantum of damages for 
that found by the jury by granting a remittitur (or additur), rather than merely granting a 
new trial on the ground of excessiveness (or inadequacy) of the jury verdict. If an uncondi- 
tional new trial is granted, the determination of damages is relegated to a new jury rather 
than, arguably, the usurpation of a judge. If, however, it could be established that similar 
reexaminations of facts found by a jury were sanctioned at the common law, remittitur and 
additur practice would not violate the seventh amendment, and no other Constitutional bar- 
rier would stand in the way of adopting of these procedures. Thus, the Court in Dimick 
embarked on a lengthy historical evaluation of practices at the common law in 1791. 293 
U.S. at 477-84. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone also included extensive historical 
analysis. 293 U.S. at 490-98. 
59. Id. at 484. 
60. Id. at 484-85. 
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decided otherwise. But . . . the doctrine has been accepted as the 
law for more than a hundred years and uniformly applied in the 
federal courts during that time. And, as it finds some support in 
the practice of the English courts prior to the adoption of the 
Constitution, we may assume that in a case involving a remitti- 
tur, which this case does not, the doctrine would not be reconsid- 
ered or disturbed at this late day. 
Thereafter, the court further referred to the general federal accept- 
ance of remittitur as a "doubtful precedent" that should "not be] 
extended by mere analogy" to add i t~ r .~ '  This grudging acceptance 
of the remittitur procedure, using only an "estoppel" or "tradition" 
argument to meet, at least in part, what the majority considered to 
be rather compelling evidence of unconstitutionality, seems like a 
rather rocky foundation on which to continue a procedure which 
has, in recent years, proliferated in the federal courts.62 Although 
the question of remittitur was not directly before the court in Di- 
mick, the Supreme Court has never again questioned the use of the 
remittitur procedure by federal courts.63 In other words, a proce- 
dural device of relative importance in the federal courts received its 
constitutional imprimatur in dictum and on the basis of a faulty 
argument. If the procedure is unconstitutional, tradition or prece- 
dent cannot make it constitutional nor allow the procedure to con- 
tinue once its constitutional defect has been identified. In 1938, 
after approximately one hundred years of "tradition," the Supreme 
Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. T o m p k i n ~ ~ ~  reversed the doctrine of 
Swift v. T y ~ o n . ~ ~  This reversal was compelled by "the unconstitu- 
61. Id. at 485. 
62. Recently, thousands of federal court defendants have, almost as a matter of course, 
made motions for the alternative relief of remittitur or new trial based on the excessiveness of 
the damages awarded by juries. See infra note 170 and accompanying text. It is doubtful 
whether a procedural device extolled as accomplishing economies of time, effort and money 
can really achieve these admirable ends when it has become the subject of an automatic post- 
trial motion rather than an extraordinary device to be employed in special circumstances. It 
is also doubtful, as noted in the text, whether such a prevalent procedure should be grounded 
on what may be considered to be questionable analytical grounds. 
63. In the few post-1935 cases in which the Supreme Court has dealt with remittitur- 
related issues, the propriety of the basic procedure has been assumed by the Court. See Don- 
ovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648 (1977) (In deciding whether a plaintiff could appeal 
from a remittitur order he had already accepted the court did not question the fact that the 
role of the courts in the federal system in reviewing a jury verdict was a matter of federal 
law.); Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77 (1955) (the Supreme Court stated that the court of 
appeals was not justified in regarding the denial of a new trial, upon remittitur of part of the 
verdict, as an abuse of discretion, thus implicitly accepting the procedure). 
64. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
65. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). In Swift, the Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Story, 
construed the Rules of Decision Act to require federal courts which were vindicating state- 
created rights to apply "the positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof 
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tionality of the course pursued,"66 rather than prevented by ideas of 
tradition and precedent. This action amply illustrates the bank- 
ruptcy of the "tradition" argument made in Dimi~k.~' 
Dimick includes, however, more than just tacit approval of re- 
mittitur because of its tradition of acceptance. The Court also dis- 
tinguished remittitur from additur in several regards, thereby 
buttressing its position that one procedure might be accepted while 
the other was rejected. First, the Court noted that an arguable, al- 
adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality" 
but to not require that such federal courts follow the general case law of the state. 41 U.S. at 
18. Thus, federal courts were free to fashion their own general federal law to "questions of a 
. . . general nature . . . as, for example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other 
written instruments and especially to questions of general commercial law . . . ." Id. at 18-19. 
In Erie, the Supreme Court "disapproved" the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, arguing that 
Swifr permitted an unconstitutional usurpation of state functions by federal courts. The 
Court concluded that "[tlhere is no federal general common law" and that federal courts 
would hereforth be required to follow state substantive law, as declared by the courts of the 
state, when these federal courts were vindicating state-created rights. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
66. 304 U.S. at 77-78. 
67. In Erie, the Supreme Court noted: "If only a question of statutory construction 
were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied through- 
out nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made 
clear and compels us to do so." Id. at 77-78. 
The distinction between the result in Erie and that in Dimick might be explained on the 
ground that Erie reversed the Swiji doctrine, which had been the target of growing dissatis- 
faction, while Dimick upheld the procedural device of remittitur which had proven useful to 
the federal courts. In Erie, the Supreme Court noted that, "[eJxperience in applying the 
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, had revealed its defects, political and social; and the benefits ex- 
pected to flow from the rule did not accrue." Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 74. In 
Dimick, on the other hand, the Supreme Court noted that remittitur had proven a useful 
procedural device which federal courts would have been loathe to lose while "no federal court 
. . . ha[d] ever undertaken . . . to increase. . . damages" by employing an additur procedure. 
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935). See generally Clark, State Law in the Federal 
Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Thompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 271-80 (1946) 
(questioning the constitutional nature of Erie, and arguing that the inconsistencies of justice 
caused by Swift made its overruling predictable); Friendly, In Praise of Erie -And of the New 
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964) (supporting the constitutional 
nature of Erie, and arguing that Erie was necessary because Swift failed to achieve its aim of 
creating uniformity in a general federal common law); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the 
Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 197 (1957) (argu- 
ing that the constitutional basis for Erie is unclear and courts should not rule on its constitu- 
tional aspects until resolved by the Supreme Court); Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 
47 YALE L. J. 1336, 1346-47 (1938) (arguing that Erie was dictated by considerations of 
policy and the widespread criticism of Swijt); Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Sub- 
stance"and "Procedure"after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REV. 271,294-95 (1939) 
(considering the constitutional argument in Erie dictum); Note, The Law Applied in Diversiry 
Cases: The Rules of Decision Act and the Erie Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J. 678 (1976) (arguing 
that most cases can be determined by the Rules of Decision Act and Erie's constitutional 
questions need not be reached). The usefulness and salubrious effects of a procedure, how- 
ever, should not serve as justification for the Supreme Court's willingness to overlook poten- 
tial constitutional defects. 
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beit weak, case could be made for remittitur on historical grounds 
as having some roots in the common law ~vhiie, in the Court's opin- 
ion, no such support could be found for a d d i t ~ r . ~ ~  Moreover, the 
Court noted that while federal courts had regularly utilized remitti- 
tur for over a hundred years, no federal court had sought to use 
additur, another form of the "tradition" arg~ment.~' Another ma- 
jor distinction which the majority identified was the fact that in ad- 
ditur the judge would be conditioning denial of a new trial on the 
defendant's agreement to increase the verdict to an amount greater 
than that found by the jury, clearly a substitution of the judge's 
evaluation of the evidence for that of the jury, while in remittitur 
the judge would be conditioning denial of a new trial on the plain- 
tiff's agreement to accept a verdict smaller than that found by the 
jury, arguably not a substitution of the trial judge's evaluation for 
that of the jury. As the majority argued:70 
Where the verdict is excessive, the practice of substituting a re- 
mission of the excess for a new trial is not without plausible sup- 
port in the view that what remains is included in the verdict 
along with the unlawful excess-in the sense that it has been 
found by the jury-and that the remittitur has the effect of 
merely lopping off an excrescense. But where the verdict is too 
small, an increase by the court is a bold addition of something 
which in no sense can be said to be included in the verdict. 
The historical argument will be addressed below in considering 
the dissenting opinion.71 The "established use" argument was re- 
jected above.72 A distinction between remittitur and additur on 
grounds that a remittitur-reduced verdict is included in the jury ver- 
dict while an additur-increased verdict is not so included is spe- 
cious. The verdict of a federal jury is supposed to be the amount 
which the jury determined to be the appropriate measure of the 
plaintiff's recoverable damages.73 It is quite as unreasonable to say 
that the jury verdict impliedly included lesser amounts as it would 
be to find an implication that greater amounts were also included. 
68. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 482 (1935). 
69. Id. at 487. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. 
70. 293 U.S. at 486. 
71. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text. 
72. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. 
73. See generally Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, 42 F.R.D. 353 (1967) (committee's draft of a bill to 
assure nondiscrimination in federal and state jury selection and service); Note, Invasion of 
Jury Deliberations: Existing Rules and Suggested Changes, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 445 (1970); 
Note, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 258 (1970); Note, Impeachment of 
Jury Verdicts by Jurors: A Proposal, 1969 U .  ILL. L.F. 388. 
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The jury does not provide a "range" of appropriate jury-found ver- 
dicts, with its announced verdict being the maximum in the range. 
If such a view were adopted, a more reasonable conclusion would 
be that the announced jury verdict formed the midpoint of some 
allowable range of verdicts. In the United States jury system, how- 
ever, one function of the jury is to agree on a single amount which 
either each member of the jury (if a unanimous verdict is required) 
or the required majority of the jury, determined to be the amount 
necessary to compensate the plaintiff.74 Both decreasing and in- 
creasing this amount involve a trial judge's substitution of his own 
evaluation of the facts for that of the jury. The above description of 
the function of a civil jury derives from interpretations of the sev- 
enth amendment;75 therefore, the underlying question at hand is 
whether either procedure violates the seventh amendment proscrip- 
tion of reexamining facts tried by a jury in a manner other than that 
recognized at the common law.76 
The dissenters in Dimick maintained that proper historical anal- 
ysis would lead to the conclusion that neither remittitur nor additur 
violate the seventh amendment.77 Noting that "[tlhere is nothing in 
its history or language to suggest that the amendment had any pur- 
pose but to preserve the essentials of the jury trial as it was known 
to the common law,"78 the dissenting opinion went on to point out 
that the amendment had not been interpreted to ''confine the trial 
judge, in determining what issues are for the jury and what for the 
court, to the particular forms of trial practice in vogue in 1791."79 
New procedural devices, unknown at the common law, had been 
employed without constitutional objection; "this court has found in 
the seventh amendment no bar to the adoption by the federal courts 
of .  . . novel methods of dealing with the verdict of a jury . . . . Y Y ~ O  
Viewing the term "common law" to refer to a decision-making pro- 
cess rather than a freeze-frame photograph of the practices and pro- 
cedures of English courts in 179lY8' the dissenters concluded that 
74. See supra note 73. See also supra note 7. 
75. See supra note 73. See also supra note 7. 
76. See supra note 58. 
77. 293 U.S. 474, 488-98 (1935). 
78. Id. at 490. 
79. Id. at 491. 
80. Id. at 492. 
81. Prior to Dimick, the Supreme Court had frequently asserted that the purpose of the 
seventh amendment was to preserve the substance of a common law jury trial, not the forms 
of procedure employed at the common law. See, e.g., Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. 
Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931); Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897). 
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additur would not affect the essentials of the jury's function.g2 Be- 
cause of the structure of the common law courts, the question 
before the court was "one unknown to the common law," and, thus, 
the dissenters saw no reason to search the common law for analo- 
gous or contrary cases.g3 The dissenters further buttressed their po- 
sition by noting that the Supreme Court had not fourid difficulty in 
"modernizing" the rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in 
federal courts:g4 
The common law is not one system when it, or some part of it, is 
adopted by the Judiciary Act, and another if it is taken over by 
the seventh amendment. If this court could thus, in conformity 
with the common law, substitute a new rule for an old one be- 
cause it was more consonant with modern conditions, it would 
seem that no violence would be done to the common law by ex- 
tending the principle of remittitur to the case where the verdict is 
inadequate, although the common law had made no rule on the 
subject in 1791 . . . . 
Some commentatorsg5 and judges,86 after considering the histor- 
ical data, have concluded that the seventh amendment should not 
bar either remittitur or additur. Some have based their conclusions 
on the dissent's argument that neither remittitur nor additur was a 
recognized procedure at the common law, and that the common 
law was not meant to be a static set of rules and precedents, but 
rather a dispute-resolution approach to which new procedures 
could be added when new problems arose.87 Under the structure of 
the judicial system at the common law, conditional new trial orders 
could never be required because the situation in which such orders 
could be made would not arise. On the other hand, under the sub- 
stantially different structure adopted in the United States federal 
courts, such orders were a natural result of the functioning of the 
trial process.88 This argument, which makes very good sense, could 
- 
82. 293 U.S. at 492. 
83. Id. The dissent noted that appellate court review of a trial court's discretionary 
action, such as the one at issue, would not have been available at the common law. Id. at 
491-92, 492 n.2. 
84. Id. at 496. 
85. See, eg., Comment, Additur and Remittitur, supra note 15, at 163; Comment, Cor- 
rection of Damage Verdicts, supra note 15, at 323-24. But see Comment, Remittitur Review, 
supra note 15, at 386-91, 400 (maintaining that remittitur is unconstitutional in cases in 
which "damages are unliquidated and no clear rules of law apply"). 
86. See, eg., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 488-98 (1935) (dissenting opinion); 
Schiedt v. Dimick, 70 F.2d 558, 563 (1st Cir. 1934) (dissenting opinion). 
87. See, eg., Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts, supra note 15, at 323-24. 
88. The dissenting opinion in Sunray Oil Corp. v. Allbritton, 187 E2d 475 (5th Cir. 
1951), a case dealing with the authority of appellate courts to require that a successful plain- 
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be summarized as follows: If the federal courts had been structured 
identically with the common law system, it would be reasonable to 
search the common law for precedents for remittitur and additur. 
When, however, the system changed substantially in the transporta- 
tion from England to the United States, the search for specific cases 
to support a new procedure in a new system is nonsensical. 
Some authorities have gone beyond the dissent in Dimick by 
finding, in the common law, historical antecedents for remittitur 
and a d d i t ~ r . ~ ~  These commentators would ascribe the Dimick ma- 
jority's analysis to incorrect interpretation of the historical data. 
Some authorities further question the result in Dimick, not on 
its constitutional analysis but on the defensibility of treating additur 
differently from remittit~r.~' These courts and commentators argue 
that both procedures should be employed or both should be re- 
jected, there being no real conceptual distinction between them in 
terms of the inviolability of the verdict of the jury. 
The dissenters in Dimick had the better position both in logic 
and in constitutional analysis. Despite the seventh amendment, 
both procedural devices should be available to federal courts. On 
the other hand, however, the manner in which some federal courts 
use the device creates a violation of the right to a trial by jury, not 
because of historical precedent, but because of current abuse of the 
procedure by overzealous trial and appellate court judgesg' More- 
over, for reasons other than the seventh amendment, the procedure 
of remittitur, as currently employed by the federal courts, should be 
tiff remit the excessive part of a verdict or submit to a new trial, included detailed historical 
analysis. Id. at 477-84 (Holmes, J. dissenting). Judge Holmes pointed out that, according to 
Blackstone, common law courts not only had jurisdiction to, but were obligated to, amend 
jury verdicts in regard of errors of law and fact and, if the trial court was unable to make the 
correction, "it was referred to a higher tribunal." Id. at 480 (quoting Bracton, as quoted in 
Blackstone's Commentaries). Moreover, "@like the earlier inferior courts of the United 
States that exercised both original and appellate jurisdiction, the King's Bench was presided 
over by one or more judges, who sat together in courts that were mutually connected." Id at 
480. The maior ~rocedural difference between current United States courts and the common 
- - 
law courts, is that at the common law a motion for a new trial was not heard by the trial 
judge but in a separate proceeding before the King's Bench en banc. Id. at 484 n.lO. Thus, at 
the common law there would have been no opportunity for a trial judge to grant a new trial at 
all, so the possibility of a conditional new trial could not be contemplated. 
89. See, e.g., Sunray Oil Corp. v. Allbritton, 187 F.2d 475, 477-84 (5th Cir. 1951) 
(Holmes, J. dissenting); Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts, supra note 15, at 323-24. 
90. See, e.g., Comment, Additur and Remittitur, supra note 15, at 160-63; Comment 
Statutory Authorization, supra note 15, at 113; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at 
673-74. 
91. See infra notes 180-233 and accompanying text. 
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substantially changed, curtailed or eliminated entirely.92 Instead of 
adopting additur wholesale, if additur is to be used, its practice 
should also be substantially limited along lines similar to those de- 
scribed below for remittitur. The house of cards, which started 
with Mr. Justice Story in Blunt v. Little, should be toppled and a 
new, more efficacious structure erected.93 
B. Current Remittitur Practice 
Before an examination of current remittitur practice, with a 
view toward suggesting remedial alternatives, the basics of the pro- 
cedural device, as now employed by federal courts, must be out- 
lined. As noted aboveYg4 a defendant who thinks that the jury 
verdict against him is excessive, may move for a new trial on that 
ground. The defendant may, in addition, move for a remittitur-a 
new trial conditioned on the plaintiff's refusal to remit the excess 
part of his verdict.95 The trial judge may make a conditional new 
trial order even if the defendant has merely asked for a new trial on 
the ground of excessi~eness.~~ The defendant's agreement to this 
remittitur procedure is neither necessary nor sought, because, in 
theory at least, he cannot complain-if the plaintiff refuses to remit, 
the defendant will get the desired new trial, and if the plaintiff 
agrees to remit, the defect in the verdict will be cured and any need 
for the desired new trial will be elin~inated.~' In fact, in view of the 
federal trial judge's power, under Rule 59(d) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to order a new trial on his "own initiative . . . for 
any reason for which [he] might have granted a new trial on motion 
of a party,"98 the trial judge should also have the power to order a 
remittitur on his own initiati~e.9~ Of course, a defendant who had 
92. See infra notes 248-63 and accompanying text. 
93. See infra notes 248-63 and accompanying text. 
94. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. 
96. Remittitur practice has not evolved as a device sought by defendants, but as a device 
available to a trial judge who wanted to circumvent the need to grant a total or partial new 
trial. See supra notes 14-37 and accompanying text. 
97. See. eg., Carlin, supra note 15, at 12-13; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at 
672. 
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(d). 
99. See Marder v. Conwed, 75 F.R.D. 48,70 (E.D. Pa. 1977). A conditional new trial 
order on the court's own initiative might be viewed as an inappropriate intrusion on the 
adversary system. Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 302 n.23. Moreover, a trial 
judge should be wary of his own assessment of damages as being excessive if the defendant 
has not objected. Id Those arguments, however, do not recognize that the defendant may 
not be aware of the excessive nature of the verdict. The trial judge's power to order a new 
trial on his own initiative should function to protect each party from the possibility that a 
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not moved for a new trial could hardly complain of such a boon. 
The plaintiff, on the other hand, would certainly feel slighted if a 
trial judge took such action in the absence of a defendant's 
request. loo 
Only certain excessive verdicts can be "cured" by the proper 
application of remittitur. Most federal courts do not employ remit- 
titur if the trial judge finds that the excessiveness of the jury verdict 
is a result of "passion or prejudice" on the part of the jury.lo1 In 
harmful error which occurred at trial was not recognized by him or by his attorney. The trial 
process should not be a game in which the party must "say the magic word" or suffer the 
consequences of a verdict which is the product of prejudicial error. Moreover, the defendant 
might have tactical reasons for not seeking a new trial even though he views the damages as 
excessive. The trial judge has the responsibility to correct prejudicial errors by granting a 
new trial. If the defendant does not want the new trial (assuming that the plaintiff has re- 
fused to remit), he can enter into a post-trial settlement with the plaintiff. 
100. As noted above, see supra note 99, not only should the trial judge have the power to 
enter such a new trial order on his own initiative, but he also has an affirmative duty to the 
judicial system to do so. If he did not so act, a plaintiff might obtain the fruits of an illegally 
excessive verdict (a verdict which is excessive as a matter of law) just because the defendant 
and his attorney did not appreciate the relevant law. 
This Article, proposes elimination of current remittitur practice in favor of alternative 
procedures. See infra notes 247-62 and accompanying text. This proposal would not, how- 
ever, affect the trial judge's power to order a whole new trial on his own initiative on the 
ground of excessiveness of the jury verdict. 
101. See, Westbrook v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1241 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(court orders new trial rather than remittitur because the jury was influenced by an erroneous 
argument, noting that "[wlhen a jury verdict results from passion or prejudice, a new trial is 
the proper remedy rather than remittitur"); Howell v. Marmpegaso Compania Naviera, 532 
F.2d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir. 1976) (court remands to district court for that court to calculate 
and order a remittitur of part of excessive award for past and future pain and loss of earning 
capacity, noting that "we do not believe the jury was actuated in its verdict by passion or 
prejudice, and it is thus appropriate for us to consider ordering a conditional remittitur" 
(footnote omitted)); Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458, 463, 465 (E.D. Tex. 
1985) (court orders remittitur of actual and punitive damages, noting that "[tlrial courts 
should employ remittiturs for those verdicts that are so large as to be contrary to right rea- 
son, while requiring a new trial on issues infected by passion or prejudice" and finding that 
"the jurors in this case were not infected by passion or prejudice"); Hodges v. Keystone 
Shipping Co., 578 F. Supp. 620, 624 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (court orders remittitur of compensa- 
tory damages, noting that "[wlhen [considering] a motion for new trial on the issue of exces- 
sive damages, the court may, if the verdict is not judged to have been the result of the jury's 
passion or prejudice, offer the plaintiff the options of new trial or remittitur" and concluding 
that "the jury verdict was not the result of passion or prejudice"); Dick v. Wantonwan 
County, 562 F. Supp. 1083, 1107-98 (D. Minn. 1983) (court orders remittitur of compensa- 
tory damages, noting that "[a] new trial is mandatory when the excessive verdict results from 
passion and prejudice on the part of the jury because of the possibility that these influences 
affected the jury's findings on liability as well as on damages" and concluding that the verdict 
"is not so excessive as to give rise to the inference that the jury was motivated by passion and 
prejudice"); Schreffler v. Board of Educ., 506 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (D. Del. 1981) (court 
orders remittitur of compensatory and punitive damages, noting that "where the verdict is so 
grossly excessive as to admit of no other conclusion than that it was the result of passion or 
prejudice, the proper remedy is a new trial and not remittitur" and that "[wlhere . . . the 
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such circumstances, trial judges should order a new trial because 
passion or prejudice renders defective the entire verdict and not just 
the jury's assessment of the proper measure of damages. The trial 
judge must determine, however, whether the jury acted with pas- 
sion or prejudice, usually a difficult determination based on infer- 
ences. Often the defendant will argue that the size of a large 
verdict, in itself, demonstrates passion or prejudice by the jury.lo2 
The defendant may also focus on improprieties in the conduct of the 
plaintiff's case, such as improper arguments by the plaintiff's coun- 
verdict is not patently the product of bias, passion or prejudice, but simply is 'just too much' 
for the Court conscionably to tolerate, the verdict may be modified by granting a remittitur," 
concluding that the jury award was "too much" but apparently not "so grossly excessive"); 
Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1,2 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (court orders a new trial 
on the issue of compensatory and punitive damages, noting that jury verdict based on passion 
or prejudice must result in a new trial because to try to assess and correct the defect by 
remittitur would be speculative and finding that the relative circumstances of the parties-the 
plaintiff being a sick, old woman and the defendant being a large corporation-and an appeal 
by the plaintiff to the jury for compassion combined to bias the jury); Collins v. Retail Credit 
Co., 410 F. Supp. 924, 933-34 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (court orders remittitur of punitive dam- 
ages, concluding that the excessive jury verdict was "based on sufficient evidence and reason 
and was not the result of passion and prejudice."). Some courts seem to use "passion or 
prejudice" as a threshold for those situations in which any interference with a jury verdict, 
including remittitur, would be appropriate. See, Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F. 
Supp. 403, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court orders remittitur of punitive damage award, stating, 
"[tlhe court may intervene and set aside a verdict when the amount of the award is so exces- 
sive that it shocks the judical conscience or it appears that it is the result of passion and 
prejudice."). 
Most appellate courts articulate a strict standard for interfering with jury verdicts, and 
some courts base the standard on passion or prejudice. These courts, however, generally 
indicate that, upon finding passion or prejudice, the court has the option of remittitur or new 
trial, thereby taking upon themselves the job of "curing" the tainted verdict. See, Martin v. 
Fleissner GMBH, 741 F.2d 61,65 (4th Cir. 1984) (court refuses to order new trial or remitti- 
tur on actual damages, stating, "[tlhe amount of damages is peculiarly within the discretion 
of the jury and subject to correction by the trial court when it is convinced an award is over 
liberal, and by an appellate court only . . . in those extreme cases in which the amount 
assessed is so shockingly excessive as manifestly to show that the jury was actuated by ca- 
price, passion, or prejudice.") (quoting Hicks v. Hemng, 246 S.C. 429,436,144 S.E. 2d 151, 
154 (1965)); Adams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 556 F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1977) (court 
refuses to order new trial or remittitur on damages, stating, "the right of a plaintiff to have 
this fact issue decided by a jury devolves from the seventh amendment . . . and it is only in 
case the amount awarded by a jury appears to be so excessive as to be unconscionable and to 
arise from bias or prejudice that the appellate court considers it appropriate to intervene."). 
See also, eg., Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276,281-82 (5th Cir. 1975); Gor- 
salitz v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 429 F.2d 1033, 1043 (5th Cir. 1970). 
102. In Dick v. Watonwan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083 @. Minn. 1983), a case arising 
from involuntary commitment of plaintiffs for alcoholism treatment, the court noted: "The 
defendants contend that the size of the verdict- $1 million in compensatory damgages and 
$12,000 in punitive damages-automatically gives rise to an inference that the jury was moti- 
vated by passion and prejudice." Id. at 1107. See also Schreffler v. Board of Educ., 506 F. 
Supp. 1300, 1308 @. Del. 1981) (suggesting that a verdict could be "so grossly excessive as to 
admit of no other conclusion than that it was the result of passion or prejudice. . . ."). 
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sel, as mandating the conclusion that the entire trial was tainted by 
jury passion or prejudice.lo3 The trial judge, in an effort to preserve 
as much of the original trial as possible, will often rule against the 
defendant on these arguments, describing the misconduct as harm- 
less error and ascribing the excessiveness of the verdict to immoder- 
ate zeal on the part of the jury.lo4 Some judges, however, order 
remittiturs even though they find that prejudicial error occurred at 
103. Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984), was a 
wrongful death action arising from an airplane crash. The district court ordered a remittitur 
of $4,274,500, on the grounds that testimony adduced at trial was flawed and should not 
have been admitted and that defects in discovery had denied the defendants a fair trial. The 
court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, stating: 
We need not choose among these various [remittitur] rules, however, for these for- 
mulations are not appropriate for use in the instant case. These formulations are 
designed for circumstances in which a properly instructed jury hearing properly 
admitted evidence nevertheless makes an excessive award. They are not designed 
for a case such as the present one, in which prejudicial error has infected the jury's 
entire consideration of plaintiff's pecuniary loss. 
Id. at 50. See also Westbrook v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1238-43 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (court remands for new trial rather than grant remittitur because of improper 
argument by plaintiff's attorney which was not corrected by trial judge and thus amounted to 
prejudicial error); Evers v. Equifax, Inc., 650 F.2d 793, 797-98 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff ob- 
jected to new trial order at  the trial court level, arguing that a remittitur should have been 
granted; court of appeals rejects argument, noting that remittitur is discretionary and that 
verdict in first trial was tainted by a combination of circumstances including two improper 
appeals to the jury by the plaintiff's attorney, and the jury's apparent desire, as indicated in a 
note to the judge, to punish the defendant); City of Cleveland v. Peter Kiewit Sons', 624 F.2d 
749,755 (6th Cir. 1980) (Action instituted by city for damages to public dock. District court 
ordered remittitur of 50% of jury award, and city refused to remit. At second trial, the city 
obtained judgment for full amount sought, and the court of appeals reversed, granting a new 
trial on all issues because of "pervasive misconduct of counsel for the City" at the trial.); 
Jamison Co. v. Westvaco Corp., 530 F.2d 34, 34 (5th Cir. 1976) (court of appeals finds ver- 
dict excessive and orders a new trial because it was "unable to determine the theory of liabil- 
ity on which the jury premised its overly generous verdict. . . [and thus could not] limit . . . 
remand to a remittitur or a partial new trial."); Libco Corp. v. Dusek, No. 77 Civ. 4386 
(N.D. 111. Apr. 29, 1986) (trial court ordered new trial on its own initiative based on excessive 
damages. After various procedural events, a different trial court affirmed the new trial order, 
rather than opting for remittitur, because of jury confusion arising from trial court's instruc- 
tions); Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. "Ming Giant," 552 F. Supp. 367, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982) (court grants "motions to set aside or reduce the verdict. . . by reason of the excessive- 
ness of the jury's award and the willful misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in tampering with 
the evidence transmitted to the deliberating jury."); Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F. 
Supp. 1, 1-2 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (court grants new trial on damages because excessive jury 
verdict was a product of passion or prejudice produced, at least in part, by the plaintiff's 
improper appeal to the jury's compassion); Uris v. Gurney's Inn Corp., 405 F. Supp. 744,747 
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (although trial court finds that "[tlhe excessiveness of the verdict was un- 
doubtedly the result of [plaintiff's] counsel's suggestion of specific amounts to the jury," the 
court orders remittitur.). 
104. See, e.g., Walters v. MintecAnt'l, 758 F.2d 73, 82 (3rd Cir. 1985); Hansen v. Johns- 
Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1047 (5th Cir. 1984); Schreffler v. Bd. of Educ., 506 F. 
Supp. 1300, 1308 (D. Del. 1981). 
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trial.lo5 These judges seek to identify the manner in which the error 
affected the jury verdict, and to cure the error by asking the plaintiff 
to remit the "infected" amount.lo6 In so doing, however, the trial 
judge might be overstepping the allowable limits on protecting the 
fruits of his labors. The defendant can point to the error and claim 
that other defendants in similar circumstances have been granted 
new trials instead of having the trial judge try to "correct" the jury 
verdict in this piecemeal way.lo7 The defendant can further argue 
that the whole course of the trial might have been different had the 
error not occurred. On the other hand, where the prejudicial error 
amounts to an identifiable element in the verdict, such as the trial 
judge's incorrect inclusion in his instructions to the jury of an unal- 
lowable element of damages,log such as incorrect valuation of inter- 
est, remittitur of the calculable amount ascribable to the error 
would be appropriate and would benefit everyone involved.109 The 
line drawn by courts in such cases has varied from court to court 
and from case to case.l1° 
The trial judge must, of course, also decide whether the jury 
verdict is excessive at all. If the court decides that the verdict is not 
excessive, the court will deny the defendant's new trial motion on 
105. See Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. "Ming Giant," 552 F. Supp. 367, 369 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court grants remittitur even though excessive verdict is the result of "willful 
misconduct of plaintiff's counsel"); Uris v. Gurney's Inn Corp., 405 E Supp. 744,747 (court 
grants remittitur even though the excessive verdict is the result of improper arguments by 
plaintiff's counsel). 
106. Seesupra note 105. If the source of prejudicial error is the conduct of the plaintiff or 
his attorney, a remittitur would attempt to save a defective proceeding by curing only one 
manifestation of the defect, the excessive verdict. Such an approach is extremely unfair to the 
defendant and encourages the plaintiff to engage in unfair trial tactics. 
107. See Westbrook v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1238-43 (5th Cir. 
1985) (court orders new trial in excessive verdict case because of improper argument by plain- 
tiff's attorney); Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(court orders new trial in excessive verdict case because of plaintiff's improper introduction 
of flawed testimony and because of defective discovery); Evers v. Equifax, Inc., 650 F.2d 793, 
797-98 (5th Cir. 1981) (court confirms new trial order in case involving improper appeals to 
the jury by the plaintiff's attorney); City of Cleveland v. Peter Kiewit Sons', 624 F.2d 749, 
760 (6th Cir. 1980) (court orders new trial on ground of misconduct of plaintiff's attorney); 
Jamison Co. v. Westvaw Corp., 530 F.2d 34, 34 (5th Cir. 1976) (court orders new trial 
because of confusing trial court jury instructions as to differing theories of liability); Libco 
Corp. v. Dusek, No. 77 Civ. 4386 (N.D. 111. Apr. 29, 1986) (court confirms new trial on 
ground of confusing jury instructions); Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1, 1-2 
(E.D. Tenn. 1978) (court orders new trial, in part because of plaintiff's improper appeal to 
the jury). 
108. See infra notes 117-18, 130-32 and accompanying text. See also infra text acwmpa- 
nying notes 127, 181-82, 257-60. 
109. See infra notes 117-18. 
110. See infra notes 117-18. 
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the ground of excessiveness, and will deny the defendant's motion 
for a remittitur."' In making such a decision, the trial courts usu- 
111. See, Union Oil Co. v. Rainey, 777 ~ . 2 d  705, 709 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) 
(court refuses to disturb jury award as to punitive or compensatory damages, finding the 
awards supported by ample evidence in the record); Pucalik v. Holiday Inns, 777 F.2d 359. 
363-64 (7th Cir. 1985) (court refuses to disturb jury award of $1,250,000 in wrongful death 
case, basing its decision on the elements of damage allowable under the Indiana wrongful 
death statute and the circumstances of the case); Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360, 368 (7th Cir. 
1985) (court refuses to disturb compensatory damage award of $80,770 for prior prison in- 
mate, finding the award "considering the circumstances of this case [not] . . . shocking."); 
Alaniz v. San Isidro Indep. Sch. Dist., 742 F.2d 207, 209 (5th Cir. 1984) (court refuses to 
disturb jury award of $101,016.96 for lost wages and compensatory damages in civil rights 
action for wrongful discharge, finding "sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's 
findings."); Hurd v. American Hoist & Demck Co., 734 F.2d 495, 502-03 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(court refuses to disturb jury award of $80,000 for actual and compensatory damages in 
products liability suit, finding the award not excessive and supported by the evidence.); Blev- 
ins v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 728 F.2d 1576, 1579-82 (10th Cir. 1984) (court refuses to disturb 
jury award of $2,000,000 in actual damages and damages for pain and suffering arising from 
injuries sustained during emergency landing, noting that "we cannot say that the jury's award 
for pain, suffering and disability 'shocks the judicial conscience' "); Martin v. Texaco, Inc.. 
726 F.2d 207,217 (5th Cir. 1984) (court refuses to disturb jury award of $1,000,000 in exem- 
plary damages to decedent's widow, finding that "[tlhe award was based on a jury finding of 
gross negligence, and the amount was not inappropriate"); Vanskike v. Union Pac. R.R., 725 
F.2d 1146, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984) (court refuses to disturb jury award of $1,811,177 for com- 
pensatory damages for personal injury, finding that "the verdict is not grossly excessive"); 
McDonald v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 724 F.2d 243, 246-48 (1st Cir. 1984) (court refuses 
to disturb jury award of $949,000 in damages for breach of warranty and negligent design of 
mace cannister, finding that on "[vliewing the evidence on damages in the light most 
favorable to [plaintiff], we do not regard the jury verdict as grossly excessive"); Whiteley v. 
OKC Corp., 719 F.2d 1051, 1058 (10th Cir. 1983) (court refuses to disturb jury award of 
$151,700 for breach of warranties, finding "we are not shocked by the size of the verdict 
awarded"); Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 934-35 (5th Cir. 1982) (court 
refuses to disturb jury award of $600,000 to estate of automobile passenger injured in crash, 
finding that the award did not "clearly exceed. . . that amount that any reasonable man could 
feel [he] is entitled to"); Frank v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245, 1254 (10th Cir. 1980) (court refuses 
to disturb jury award of $85,000 in suit for attorney's fees, finding that the jury verdict did 
not reach the point at which it "clearly appear[ed] that the jury [had] reached a seriously 
erroneous result."); Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 1981) (court 
refuses to disturb jury award of $35,000 against union for breach of its duty of fair representa- 
tion, finding that "[tlhe jury's award was well within the limits of the proof"); Crador v. 
Louisiana Dep't. of Highways, 625 F.2d 1227, 1230 (5th Cir. 1980) (court refuses to disturb 
jury award of $250,000 for loss of income and pain and suffering because of back injury, 
finding themselves "not prepared to say that it is 'certain indeed that the award is contrary to 
all reason' "); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286,295-97 (7th Cir. 1979) (court refuses 
to disturb jury award of $700,000 in compensatory damages in wrongful death action, finding 
that although they thought the verdict was "too high," it was not so high as to be "grossly 
excessive"); Rosen v. LTV Recreational Dev., Inc., 569 F.2d 11 17, 1123 (10th Cir. 1978) 
(court refuses to disturb jury award of $200,000 for injuries sustained in a skiing accident, 
finding that while "it might strike us that the award . . . is high," the court was "unable to say 
in this instance that it was" so high as to be "grossly excessive"); Brown v. Skaggs-Albert- 
son's Properties, 563 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir. 1977) (court refuses to disturb jury award of 
$20,000 in actual damages and $10,000 in punitive damages arising from damages suffered 
because defendant falsely reported to a check verification association that plaintiff's check 
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ally distinguish between verdicts which are merely larger than the 
trial judge would have granted had he been given the task of assess- 
~ 
had bounced, finding that the jury award was not "so excessive as to 'strike mankind, at first 
blush, as being beyond all measure unreasonable and outrageous' "); Adarns v. Ford Motor 
Credit Co., 556 F.2d 737, 739-41 (5th Cir. 1977) (court refuses to disturb jury award of 
$20,000 as compensatory and punitive damages for wrongful repossession of an automobile, 
finding that while "other judges might well conclude that a much less substantial sum would 
be adequate . . . , we are simply unable to say that this falls into the very exceptional class of 
cases in which we can determine that the trial court abused its discretion"); Sadowski v. 
Bombardier Ltd., 539 F.2d 615,624-25 (7th Cir. 1976) (court refuses to disturb jury award of 
$100,000 for damages arising from snow-mobile accident, finding that "[ulpon the basis of the 
evidence in this case considered in the light of present day verdict ranges held to be not 
excessive, we are unable to say that the district court should have ordered a remittitur"); 
Menard v. Penrod Drilliing Co., 538 F.2d 1084, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1976) (court refuses to 
disturb jury award of $250,000 for personal injuries sustained on a submersible drilling rig, 
finding that "kliving due weight to the verdict of the jury and to the rulings of the trial judge, 
we cannot, under the applicable rules of review, hold the jury's verdict excessive"); Rawson v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 615 F. Supp. 1546, 1553 @. Colo. 1985) (court refuses to disturb jury 
award for $19,000,000 for actual damages, damages for pain and suffering, and exemplary 
damages for age discrimination, finding that the award was not excessive in view of the evi- 
dence and circumstances of the case); Jacobson v. Pitman-Moore, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 169, 
178-79 @. Minn. 1984) (court refuses to disturb jury award of $54,000 for actual damages 
from employment discrimination, finding that the award correctly reflected plaintiff's actual 
damages and that plaintif made an effort to mitigate damages); Kelly v. Illinois Cent. Gulf 
R.R., 552 F. Supp. 399, 401-03 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (court refuses to disturb jury award of 
$1,250,000 under FELA for injuries sustained in railroad yard accident, finding that "[elven 
though the result may have been too generous and was doubtless surprising [and] . . . presses 
allowable limits, I am unable to declare the verdict 'shocking' or to announce a 'firm convic- 
tion' that a 'clear miscarriage of justice' has occurred''); Vaughn v. Hardemon, 508 F. Supp. 
97.99-100 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (court refuses to disturb compensatory jury awards of $409,647 
for injured truck driver and $100,000 for his spouse, finding that "[w]hiie the award is proba- 
bly more than the court would have awarded. . . . the verdict is supported by the evidence in 
the case"), aff'd, 622 F.2d 574 @.C. Cir. 1980); Milos v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 478 F. Supp. 
1019, 1024-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court refuses to disturb jury award of $360,000 in compensa- 
tory damages for injuries sustained when plaintiff slipped and injured himself, finding that 
"[tlhe total trial record demonstrates sufficient evidentiary support of the verdict"); Washing- 
ton v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1134, 1135 @.D.C. 1979) (court refuses 
to disturb jury award of $378,890.39 in a FELA suit, finding that "[tlhe verdict is consistent 
with and is supported by evidence adduced by the plaintiff); Norfin, Inc. v. International 
Business Machs., 81 F.R.D. 614,616-17 @. Colo. 1979) (court refuses to disturb jury award 
of $7,500,000 as lost profits on patent infringement, finding that the "verdict . . . is within the 
range of the evidence [and] . . . the dollar amount is [not] of such a magnitude as to shock the 
conscience of the court"); Thornton v. Equifax, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 1008, 1011-12 (E.D. Ark. 
1979) (court refuses to disturb jury awards of $5,000 compensatory damages and $250,000 
punitive damages under Fair Credit Reporting Act and state libel law, finding that the actual 
damage award was reasonable and, further, that, in view of the defendant's massive assets, 
the puntive damage award would stand), rev'd on other grounds, 619 F.2d 700 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980); Murray v. Beloit Power Systems, 79 F.R.D. 590, 591-92 @:V.I. 
1978) (court refuses to disturb jury award of $1,747,855.60 for personal inujuries, finding that 
"the jury's award was [not] the product of irrational behavior"); United States v. 534.28 
Acres of Land, 442 F. Supp. 82, 86 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (court refuses to disturb jury award of 
$61,500 in favor of landowners, finding that "[tlhe verdict in this case was not so against the 
weight of the credible evidence as to require a new trial or remittitur"). The above cited cases 
Heinonline - -  38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 185 1987-1988 

19871 REMITTITURT (AND ADDITURS) 187 
that remittitur is only appropriate in cases in which the jury verdict 
is so large that it "shocks the conscience of the court,"l14 while a 
few judges find that shockingly large verdicts are necessarily the 
product of passion or prejudice and order a new trial on that 
ground.l15 Some judges, on the other hand, seem to grant remit- 
titurs in any case in which the judge disagrees with the verdict, even 
if the amount of disagreement is relatively insubstantial.l16 Again, 
1983) (quoting Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226,228 (10th Cir. 1962) (trial court standard for 
remittitur is that verdict is "so excessive. . . as to shock the judicial conscience and to raise an 
irresistible inference that passion, prejudice . . . or other improper cause invaded the trial 
. . ."); Dick v. Watonwan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083, 1108 @. Minn. 1983) (court grants 
remittitur because it "finds that the verdict is excessive and must be reduced in order to avoid 
an unconscionable result"); Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social Sew., 547 F. Supp. 
1168, 1183 (W.D. Wis. 1982) ("court finds the verdict as to damages to be so excesssive as to 
shock the judicial conscience"), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983); Mor- 
gan v. Consolidated Rail Corp. 509 F. Supp. 281,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("the jury's resolution 
of the question of damages is not to be disturbed unless there is reason to believe it was the 
result of passion, bias or prejudice, or that it is so excessive as to shock the conscience of the 
court as a 'denial ofjustice' "); Starlings v. Ski Roundtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507,511 (M.D. 
Pa. 1980) (standard is "grossly excessive" or "so clearly excessive as to shock the conscience 
of the court"); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568,578 @. Md. 1975) ("it is the 
duty of the trial court to grant a new trial when confronted with an excessive verdict, . . . or 
when the verdict shocks the conscience of the court"). 
114. See cases cited supra note 113. 
115. In Proler v. Modem Equip. Co., 602 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Wis. 1985), a patent 
infringement suit in which the jury awarded $75,000,000 in compensatory damages and $1 in 
punitive damages, the court concluded that remittitur would be out of the question. 
As to damages, the w e  is . . . a fairy tale. If one closes one's eyes to reality, 
perhaps it can be said that there is testimony in the record to support it. However, 
the testimony given by Dr. Elliott is based for the most part on sheer speculation 
. . . . 
Common sense is offended by the verdict. 
. . . . 
If the jury award in this case had been $1.00 for compensatory and 
$75,000,000.00 for punitive damages it would still be excessive as a whole, but at 
least it would be somewhat more understandable. As it is, however, the award for 
compensatory damages is clearly excessive. It simply cannot be sustained. Because 
I find the damages to be excessive, I could grant a limited new trial or offer Mr. 
Proler a remittitur option, as the award does not appear to have been motivated by 
any prejudice on the part of the jury against Modem. A remittitur, however, would 
only be in the $100,000-$200,000 range, and because a sum in that area is so far 
removed from what the jury awarded, I decline to offer an option. 
602 F. Supp. at 1393-94. 
Another district court has stated that "[t]echnically, where the verdict is so grossly exces- 
sive as to admit of no other conclusion than that it was the result of passion or prejudice, the 
proper remedy is a new trial and not a remittitur." Schreffler v. Board of Educ., 506 F. Supp. 
1300, 1308 @. Del. 1981). See ako, ag., Lowe v. General Motors, 624 F.2d 1373, 1383 (5th 
Cir. 1980); Perfect Fit Indus. v. Acme Quilting Co., 494 F. Supp. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), 
modifid, 646 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1981). But see, e.g., Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1547- 
50 (11th Cir. 1984) (appellate court orders remittitur of 90% of verdict rather than finding 
extreme excess requires new trial). 
116. Knight v. Texaco, 786 F.2d 1296, 1299-1301 (5th Cir. 1986) (court affirms district 
court remittitur of 17.6% of jury verdict); Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 741 F.2d 87, 93 
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distinctions should be drawn between cases in which the errone- 
ously excessive portion of the jury verdict is a liquidated amount- 
that is where the source of error is identifiable and the measure of 
damages traceable to the error is calculable, hereinafter "liquidated 
amount case~""~-and those cases in which the trial judge cannot 
identify any particular source of error or cannot calculate an exact 
(5th Cir. 1984) (appellate court reverses award of punitive damages and attorney's fees, while 
ordering remittitur of 20% of compensatory damage award); Stineman v. Fontbonne College, 
664 F.2d 1082, 1090 (8th Cir. 1981) (appellate court orders remittitur of 25% of compensa- 
tory damages); Carlton v. H.C. Price Co., 640 F.2d 573, 582 (5th Cir. 1981) (appellate court 
orders one plaintiff to remit 29.6% of award for future medical expenses); Dullard v. Berke- 
ley Assoc., 606 F.2d 890, 896 (2d Cir. 1979) (appellate court orders remittitur of 23.5% of 
award of damages for wrongful death); Kropp v. Ziebarth, 601 F.2d 1348, 1355 (8th Cir. 
1979) (appellate court orders remittitur of 21.8% of damages for breach of contract); Com- 
munity Television Servs. v. Dresser Indus., 435 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D.S.D. 1977), aff'd, 586 
F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979) (court orders remittitur of 8% of 
jury verdict for breach of warranty); Meyer v. W.R. Grace & Co., 421 F. Supp. 1331, 1336 
(E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 565 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) (court orders remitti- 
tur of 5.7% of jury verdict for breach of employment contract); Martin B. Glauser Dodge 
Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1009, 1019-23 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd on othergrounds, 570 
F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978) (court orders remittitur of 15.5% of 
damages for antitrust violation). 
117. Such cases would include not only circumstances in which the jury miscalculated 
the damages (for example, because of a typographical error in papers submitted to the jury or 
because of some clear mechanical error in the damage calculation), but also, cases in which 
the elements of damage are established by law, thus requiring a certain result, but in which 
the jury came up with a different figure. In the first category of cases, excessive verdict based 
on mechnical errors probably could not be avoided. In the second category of cases, where 
the elements of a damage calculation are established as a matter of law, however, such 
problems could be eliminated if the trial judge sought a special verdict, pursuant to Rule 
49(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in which the court would submit specific ques- 
tions of fact to the jury but would then calculate damages, according to the jury's allocation 
of liability, based on the appropriate legal formula. In Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 57-58 
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985), the court remanded for a new trial on 
the issue of damages, noting, "had . . . particularized special verdicts been returned . . . as to 
damages . . . both our task, and that of the parties and the District Court on remand, would 
have been greatly facilitated." 
Many recent remittitur cases have either been "liquidated amount cases" or the court has 
treated the case as such by making a mechanical calculation, usually based on prior awards in 
similar cases, of allowable damages. See Enterprise Ref. v. Sector Ref., 781 F.2d 11 16, 1120 
(5th Cir. 1986) (remittitur or new trial in breach of service contract case because jury 
awarded $731,600 while court found that "[tlhere is nothing to be balanced and nothing to be 
weighed; the record is wholly devoid of any support for any figure in excess of $422,220.00," 
a figure suggested by plaintiff's own expert witness); Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 
F.2d 821, 826-34 (11th Cir. 1985) (court orders remittitur of part of jury award for lost 
wages, calculating, on the basis of the facts, the maximum allowable recovery on those facts 
for lost wages); Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1984) (in 
wrongful death action for loss of adult son, court orders remittitur of award in excess of sum 
of high recent award granted plus one third); American Anodco, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals, 
743 F.2d 417, 425 (6th Cir. 1984) (court orders remittitur of amount attributable to one 
element of damages not properly proven at trial, noting that "[wlhen evidence of damages has 
been admitted erroneously and the effect of the error can be reasonably approximated to a 
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amount traceable to the error. In "liquidated amount cases," a re- 
definite portion of the verdict, this court may condition its affirmance on the plaintiff remit- 
ting that portion of the verdict"); Big John, B.V. v. Indian Head Grain Co., 718 F.2d 143, 
150 (5th Cir. 1983) (court affirms district court order of remittitur of $800,000 to correct jury 
error in taking a number "off the wrong line" in a chart sent into the jury room, noting that 
"remittitur should be awarded when the jury has made a clear oversight and the correction is 
mechanical"); Everett v. S.H. Parks and Assocs., 697 F.2d 250,253-55 (8th Cir. 1983) (court 
orders remittitur of part of damages awarded for breach of oral employment contract, calcu- 
lating the "maximum amount reasonably supported by [plaintiff's] evidence" and noting that 
"[w]here the discrepancy between the award and the maximum amount reasonably supported 
by the evidence is apparent and the correction basically mechanical. . . the correction can be 
made at the appellate level"); Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 871-75 (1st Cir. 1982) 
(court orders remittitur of part of damage award in breach of contract case, calculating remit- 
titur-reduced damages based on upper limits of allowable elements of damages and noting 
that "[a]lthough the jury's award was excessive as a matter of law, a new trial may not be 
necessary [because t]he deficits in the award are readily identified and measured"); United 
States v. 47.14 Acres of Land, 674 F.2d 722, 728-29 (8th Cir. 1982) (court orders remittitur 
of part of compensation award in eminent domain proceeding, basing its remittitur on expert 
calculations); Geyer v. Vargas Prods., 627 F.2d 732, 735 (5th Cir. 1980) (court affirms trial 
court remittitur in breach of contract case, the remittitur being based on the jury's error in 
failing to subtract the plaintiff's expenses avoided by not having to perform the contract); 
Kropp v. Ziebarth, 601 F.2d 1348, 1355 (8th Cir. 1979) (court orders remittitur based on its 
estimate, in a breach of contract case, "of the effect on the verdict of the inflated and duplica- 
tive damage figures" adduced at trial); Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081, 1083, 
1087 (7th Cir. 1978) (trial court had required remittitur of certain elements of compensatory 
damages which it concluded should not have been submitted to the jury; appellate court 
orders new trial or additional remittitur down to an amount "as to which there was no dis- 
pute"); Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72, 81, 86 (3d Cir. 1977) (district 
court had granted a remittitur to correct a mechanical error by the jury in damages assess- 
ment; appellate court reverses on other grounds), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Palmer 
Coal & Rock Co. v. Gulf Oil Co. 524 F.2d 884,887 (10th Cir. 1975) (appellate court confirms 
trial court remittitur order based on "computations supported by the evidence"), cert. denied, 
424 U.S. 969 (1976); Plattner v. Strick Corp., 102 F.R.D. 612,618-19 (N.D. 111. 1984) (remit- 
titur order used to cure faulty verdict which could be "traced to a specific misconception on 
the part of the jury and the effect of that misconception is readily calculable"); Jeanneret v. 
Vichey, 541 F. Supp. 80,85-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), (court orders remittitur in breach of implied 
warranty of title case by calculating the present value of the thing lost (the painting to which 
defendant did not have title) plus interest on money borrowed); rev'd on other grounds, 693 
F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1982); Marsh v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 521 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 
@. Del. 1981) (court orders remittitur of part of award for future medical expenses, basing 
its calculation on the maximum damages allowable under the evidence adduced at trial); 
Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 102-03 
@.S.C. 1979) (court orders 25% remittitur on compensatory damage award for replacement 
of roof, such remittitur representing the value to the plaintiff of five years of satisfactory use 
of roof which had been represented as a "20-year roof"), aff'd, 664 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981); 
Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 508 F. Supp. 14, 15-16 (ED. Mo. 1980)(court orders 
remittitur in age discrimination in employment case, based on readily identifiable fact that 
jury had neglected to subtract, from its calculation of lost wages, "benefits and earnings re- 
ceived by the plaintiff" after his employment was terminated), aff'd, 669 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983); Dixon v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 490 F. Supp. 
jul191, 1193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (court orders remittitur of seaman's award for maintenance 
and cure, the recoverable amount being established by union contract), afld, 646 F.2d 560 
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 838 (1981); Community Television Servs., Inc. v. 
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mittitur of a small portion of the jury verdict would be appropriate 
because the error can be identified and corrected.l18 In other cases 
in which the trial judge expresses a more generalized dissatisfaction 
with the size of the verdict, he should not be authorized to chip off 
small bits of the jury verdict; he should allow for the strong possibil- 
ity that the jury's assessment of damages is within the legally per- 
missible range of  verdict^."^ Otherwise, he would seem to be 
substituting his own verdict for that of the jury rather than merely 
correcting a mathematical error made by the jury. This caveat is 
especially applicable in cases in which part of the damages are allo- 
cated to pain and suffering or some other form of damages which 
cannot be determined with mathematical precision.120 In these ar- 
Dresser Indus., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 214, 216-18 (D.S.D. 1977) (court orders small remittitur 
based on its finding that the jury award was more than the maximum allowable on the facts 
and on its calculation of an appropriate award), aff'd, 586 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1978), cerr. 
denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979); Keystone Floor Prods. v. Beattie Mfg., 432 F. Supp. 869, 884 
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (court orders a remittitur of difference between the incentive bonus actually 
established at trial to have received by plaintiff in a prior year and the amount awarded by the 
jury which was based on a figure provided in one of the plaintiff's exhibits); Martin B. 
Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1009, 1023 (D.N.J. 1976) (court orders 
remittitur which would remove from jury verdict "certain identifiable sums . . . which were 
improper"), rev'd on other grounds, 570 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 
(1978). 
118. See Community Television Servs. v. Dresser Indus., 435 F. Supp. 214 @.S.D. 1977) 
(remittitur of 8%), a f d ,  586 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932; Meyer v. 
W.R. Grace & Co., 421 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (remittitur of 5.7%), aff'd in part. 
rev'd in part, 565 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977); Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 
418 F. Supp. 1009 (D.N.J. 1976) (remittitur of 15.5%), rev'd on other grounds, 570 F.2d 72 
(3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). 
119. See, eg., Knight v. Texaco, Inc., 786 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1986); Harper v. Zapata 
Off-Shore Co., 741 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1984); Stineman v. Fontbonne College, 664 F.2d 1082 
(8th Cir. 1981); Dullard v. Berkeley Assocs., 606 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1979). 
120. As one district court stated in the personal injury case Marsh v. Interstate & Ocean 
Transport Co.: 
Damages cannot be calculated in a strict mathematical formula, and jurors and 
judges often differ in their estimates of the appropriate amount to be awarded in a 
given case. Here, the Court cannot say that the general damages, while high, were 
so excessive as to warrant the Court's intervention into the Jury's findings. There is 
evidence in the record to justify the Jury's finding. The award of general damages 
must, therefore, be permitted to stand. 
521 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 @. Del. 1981) (citation omitted). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in a contract case, observed a 
difference in the treatment by federal courts of jury verdicts in tort cases and in contract 
cases: 
Generousness of a jury's award does not alone justify an appellate court in set- 
ting it aside. In tort cases, where the damges are given to compensate for losses not 
susceptible of arithmetical calculation, such as pain and grief, we have declined to 
second-guess a jury unless its verdict is "grossly excessive" or "shocking to the 
conscience." In contract or other cases involving only economic loss, the standard 
of review is somewhat different, although still deferential to the jury. In cases of 
that type, in the words of Judge Wisdom, a verdict is excessive as a matter of law if 
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eas the jury performs one of its most important functions-bringing 
the collective experiences of the group to bear on the consideration 
of the damages to be awarded for such a loss.121 
After a trial judge has decided that the jury verdict is excessive, 
he must then determine the amount to be remitted by the plaintiff if 
the plaintiff wishes to avoid a new trial. Most courts make the cal- 
culation of the amount to be remitted by using a "reasonable jury" 
standard, with some courts determining the amount to be remitted 
as that necessary to reduce the verdict to the amount which the trial 
judge thinks a reasonable jury would have granted.''' Other courts, 
reluctant to interfere with the jury verdict any more than is neces- 
sary, ask the plaintiff to remit the amount necessary to reduce the 
jury verdict to the "maximum amount" that a reasonable jury 
would have awarded.123 These "maximum recovery" courts con- 
clude that the trial judge tampers least with the intentions of the 
jurors, who by implication wanted to fully compensate the plain- 
tiffs, if he allows remittitur up to the maximum verdict he considers 
supportable. lZ4 
In these calculations, the trial judge is often covert in his calcu- 
lation of a reasonable jury award or a maximum reasonable jury 
shown to exceed "any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be 
based upon the evidence before the jury." Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390,413 (5th 
Cir.), cett denied, 389 U.S. 831, 88 S. Ct. 100, 19 L.Ed.2d 90 (1967). 
Kolb v. Goldring, 694 F,2d 869, 871 (1st Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). See, cg., Kelly v. 
Illinois Cent. Gulf RR., 552 F. Supp. 399, 401 (W.D. Mo. 1982). 
121. See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. 
122. See Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social Servs., 547 F. Supp. 1168, 1187 
(W.D. Wis. 1982) (court determined "as a matter of law that $10,000 in compensatory dam- 
ages and $15,000 in punitive damages is reasonable"), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1167 
(7th Cir. 1983); Uris v. Gurney's Inn Corp., 405 F. Supp. 744,747 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[als a 
guideline in determining how much of the verdict is excessive, the court adopts the approach 
favored by Professor Moore, ie, the excess over the amount the court believes a properly 
functioning jury should have found"). See also Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F. 
Supp. 403,415 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (court merely sets a figure without applying any standard), 
a r d ,  717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983). 
123. See, cg., Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821, 827 (llth Cir. 1985); 
Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F,2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1984); Sam's Style 
Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp., 694 F.2d 998, 1008 (5th Ci. 1982); Warren v. Ford 
Motor Credit Co., 693 F.2d 1373, 1380 (llth Ci. 1982); Holman v. Mark Indus., 610 F. 
Supp. 1195, 1206 @. Md. 1985); Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458, 463 (E.D. 
Tex. 1985); Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 1055, 1068 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Dick v. 
Wantowan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083, 1108 @. Minn. 1983); Morgan v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp., 509 F. Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Schreffler v. Board of Educ., 506 F. Supp. 
1300, 1309 @. Del. 1981); Community Television Servs. v. Dresser Indus., 435 F. Supp. 214, 
218 @.S.D. 1977); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568, 578 @. Md. 1975). 
124. See, eg., Dick v. Wantowan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083, 1108 @. Minn. 1983); 
Morgan v. Consol. Rail Corp., 509 F. Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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award.125 In many cases, the trial judge states the standard to be 
applied in assessing the amount to be remitted, and then, without 
revealing the analysis behind his decision, conclusively states that 
on the basis of the stated standard, no reasonable jury could have 
awarded more than $X, and, thus, the plaintiff must remit the 
amount by which the actual jury verdict exceeds A gain, a 
distinction should be made in regard to "liquidated amount cases" 
in which the court is always very explicit as to the exact calcula- 
tions and arguments necessary to reach $1, the appropriately sized 
verdict. 12' 
Once the trial court determines how much should be remitted in 
order for a new trial order on the grounds of excessiveness, the 
court will enter some sort of conditional new trial order, with the 
denial of a new trial on the ground of excessiveness being condi- 
tioned on the plaintiff's agreement to remit the amount calculated 
by the court.12* The courts have uniformly held that the plaintiff 
must be given the opportunity to elect between a new trial and a 
remittitur-reduced verdict.129 Even if the trial judge is convinced 
that the only problem with the entire trial process was the excessive 
enthusiasm of the jury in calculating damages, and that he has pre- 
cisely calculated the correct damages (a never-never land possibil- 
ity), the trial judge cannot simply enter the remittitur-reduced 
verdict as a final verdict; the trial judge must leave the choice be- 
tween reduced verdict and new trial to the plaintiff. 
This limitation on the trial judge must, however, be distin- 
guished from his authority to "correct" or "mold" a verdict where 
the correct verdict is correct.130 Such power should probably be 
125. See infra note 229 and accompanying text. 
126. See infra notes 229-39 and accompanying text. 
127. See cases cited supra note 117. 
128. See supra note 14 for a description of conditional new trial orders. 
129. See, e.g., McKinnon v. City of Benvyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1391 (7th Cir. 1984); Fenner 
v. Dependable Trucking Co., 716 F.2d 598, 603 (9th Cir. 1983); Kline v. Wolf, 702 F.2d 400, 
405 (2d Cir. 1983). 
130. See Marder v. Conwed Corp., 75 F.R.D. 48, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (motion to mold 
verdict). See also Eastern Assoc. Coal v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 475 F. Supp. 586, 593- 
94 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (if amount of error is definite, "the court is of the opinion that the matter 
can be handled by a reduction of judgment pursuant to Rule 50@) . . . . instead of following 
the cumbersome route of the remittitur resulting possibly in a lengthy retrial of the whole 
case"), rev'd on other grounds 632 F.2d 1068 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1980). Cf: 
Comment, Remittitur Review, supra note 15, at 390 (suggesting that remittitur is constiu- 
tional in "liquidated amount" cases but possibly not constitutional in cases involving unliqui- 
dated amounts or uncertain measures of damages). 
Under Rule 49@) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal court judge has the 
power to correct a jury verdict to make the verdict consistent with interrogatories. This 
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used in all cases in which an identifiable error (such as an incorrect 
jury instruction) has led to the inclusion in the verdict of an errone- 
ous amount.131 Remittitur is not necessary where a clear error can 
be corrected by "molding" the verdict; in those cases, the plaintiff 
should not be given the power to force a new trial.13' 
When the trial judge makes a conditional new trial order, he can 
order a total new trial133 or can limit the new trial to certain issues, 
usually damages.134 A partial new trial is often ordered when the 
trial judge feels that the jury decision in regard to liability is correct 
and the only problem with the verdict is in the valuation of dam- 
ages. 135 Then, if the plaintiff refuses to remit, he is only subjected to 
a partial new trial. Thus, judgment in his favor would be assured, 
with only the amount of damages to be relitigated.136 
Conditional partial new trial orders appear to be an economical 
response to circumstances in which a trial judge is convinced that 
the only defect in a trial was that the jury awarded excessive dam- 
ages. Such orders, however, might actually lead to judicial waste; a 
plaintiff who is assured of a judgment in his favor might not view a 
new trial as a particularly risky proposition. Thus, he might reject a 
reasonable remittitur order and opt for a new trial, if he feels that 
the reduced verdict is a little too sma11.13' 
After the conditional new trial order is entered, the plaintiff is 
given a certain number of days in which to affirmatively agree to the 
power, coupled with locally recognized authority to "mold" jury verdicts, should provide a 
method for resolving "liquidated amount" cases without resorting to remittitur. See supra 
notes 117-18 and accompanying text, text accompanying note 127, infra notes 134-35 and 
accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 178-79. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 49@). 
131. See supra cases cited in note 117. 
132. See infra text accompanying notes 181-82 and 258-61. 
133. See generally supra note 14. 
134. See, eg., Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 563 E Supp. 576, 585 (E.D. La. 1983), 
rev'd on other grounds, 741 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1984); Morgan v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 509 
F. Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See generally supra note 14 (citing cases in which the 
defendant's new trial motion is granted conditioned on the plaintiff's subsequent refusal to 
remit excess). 
135. See, rg., Harper, 563 F. Supp. at 585; Morgan, 509 F. Supp. at 288. See also Proler 
v. Modem Equip. Co., 602 F. Supp. 1388,1393-94 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (The judge stated that he 
could grant a limited new trial or grant a remittitur option; the judge denounced the option 
and ordered an absolute new trial only on the issue of damages). 
136. A partial new trial procedure might lead to judicial waste by encouraging plaintiffs 
to seek unrealistically high damages or engage in improper trial tactics on the theory that an 
excessive verdict will probably only lead to a remittitur or a partial new trial on damages. 
The plaintiff's prize, a finding of liability against the defendant, will not be put at risk. 
137. Seesupra note 136, infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text, and text accompany- 
ing notes 250-52. 
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r emi t t i t~ r . ' ~~  If he rejects the remittitur or if he is silent, the new 
trial is automatically ordered. At that point, neither party can ap- 
peal because a new trial will be conducted.139 After the new trial 
terminates in a final judgment, the plaintiff can appeal the original 
trial judge's new trial order as well as raise any other objections that 
he has.140 The defendant also might appeal if dissatisfied with the 
outcome. 
If the plaintiff agrees to the remittitur, the trial judge enters a 
final judgment in the remittitur-reduced amount .141  After years of 
debate in lower federal courts,142 the Supreme Court decided, in 
138. See supra note 14. 
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1948 & Supp. 1987) (provides, in part, that "[tlhe Courts of A p  
peals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the 
United States . . . ." If a trial judge orders a new trial, he does not enter a judgment pursuant 
to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and his order is not deemed "final." See 
Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, '34 (1980) (an order granting a new trial is 
not immediately appealable because of its interlocutory nature; a party seeking a writ of man- 
damus must have no other means of relief; thus a trial court order for a new trial which is 
reviewable on a direct appeal after a final judgement has been entered rarely will justify issu- 
ance of the writ). See generally Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE 
L.J. 539 (1932) (an appeal can be taken only from a final judgement; an underlying policy is 
that it is the only way in which the appellate courts can prevent themselves from being inun- 
dated with appeals). 
140. See, e.g., Conway v. Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 610 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1980); 
cases cited in 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 9 2818,115 
nn. 41-42 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1987). 
141. See supra note 14. 
142. As of 1977, the Fifth Circuit had adopted a procedure, contrary to a traditionally 
observed prohibition of remitting plaintiff appeals, of permitting such a plaintiff to remit and 
still appeal the conditional new trial order so long as he remitted "under protest," thereby 
giving notice of the possibility of an appeal. See, ag., Gilbert v. St. Louis-San Francisco 
R.R., 514 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1975); Bonura v. Sea Land Servs., Inc., 505 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 
1974), reh. and reh. en banc denied, 512 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1975); Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d 
857 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. 1160.96 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1970); 
Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 407 
U.S. 921 (1971), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 899 (1972), modifed, 456 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1972); 
Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966). The Sixth Circuit 
had also permitted remitting plaintiff appeals, but under a state law which the court had 
followed. See, e.g., Howard v. J.W. Zellner & Sons Transfer Co., 539 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 
1976); Jones v. Wittenberg Univ., 534 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1976); Burnett v. Coleman Co., 
507 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Brewer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 498 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 
1974); Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1973); Mooney v. Henderson Portion 
Pack Co., 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1964). Other circuits had not adopted the procedure, although 
the First Circuit assumed, in dictum, that "an appeal lies from a consented-to remittitur," 
Bonn v. Puerto Rico Int'l. Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89, 94 (1st Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit 
had reviewed the Fifth Circuit procedure but had reserved the decision on whether to employ 
the procedure until faced "squarely" with the issue, Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr. 
Corp., 519 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1975), and the Third Circuit had narrowly avoided the 
issue when a district court accepted a remittitur "under protest," the court of appeals revers- 
ing and remanding on other grounds. Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 
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1977 in Donovan v. Penn Shipping C O . , ' ~ ~  that plaintiffs who had 
agreed to remit could not appeal the trial court's conditional new 
trial order, even if the plaintiffs remitted "under protest."144 Ac- 
cording to the view adopted by the Supreme Court, the plaintiff, 
who has reaped the benefits of the remittitur procedure by avoiding 
a new trial cannot question the propriety of the conditional new 
trial order from which he has benefited.14' The defendant, on the 
other hand, can appeal the trial court's grant of a remittitur, argu- 
ing that he should have had the new trial, his right to which had 
been tacitly recognized by the order of the conditional new trial. 
But for the availability of remittitur, the defendant might argue, the 
trial judge would have granted a new trial on the ground of exces- 
siveness of the jury verdict.146 Moreover, the defendant often con- 
tends that the defects in the trial which culminated in the excessive 
verdict were not curable by remittitur in that the errors might have 
affected the jury's decision on the issue of liability as well as 
amount.14' Some defendants will argue, in the alternative, that the 
remittitur ordered by the trial court was too ~ m a l 1 . l ~ ~  
At the appellate level, the remitting plaintiff has nothing to gain; 
he does, however, have something to lose. While the plaintiff must 
(E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 476 F.2d 471 (3d Cu. 1973). The Seventh Circuit 
had expressly disapproved the Fifth Circuit approach in a direct appeal case, Collum v. But- 
ler, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970), and had felt compelled to dismiss a remitting plaintiff's 
cross-appeal on the basis of precedent. Shor-line Rambler, Inc. v. American Motors Sales 
Corp., 543 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1976), The Eighth Circuit also rejected the Fifth Circuit proce- 
dure, Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 491 F.2d 707 (8th Cir.), a r d ,  506 F.2d 505 (8th 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975). 
143. 429 U.S. 648 (1977) (per curiam). 
144. Id. at 649. The Court stated, "[iln order to clarify whatever uncertainty might exist, 
we now reaffirm the longstanding rule that a plaintiff in federal court. . . may not appeal from 
a remittitur order he has accepted." Id. at 650. The Court also rejected Sixth Circuit reli- 
ance on state law, stating that "[tlhe proper role of the trial and appellate courts in the federal 
system in reviewing the size of jury verdicts is . . . a matter of federal law." Id. at 649. 
145. Id. 
146. See, eg., Carlin, supra note 15, at 12-13; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at 
672. 
147. In Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984), the de- 
fendants had appealed from a remittitur reduced verdict, 574 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), 
arguing that the verdict was still excessive and that they should be granted a new trial or an 
increased remittitur. The court concluded that "use of remittitur deprived the defendants of 
their right to a jury trial on the issue of pecuniary loss" and remanded for a new trial on that 
issue. 742 F.2d at 47. See also Knight v. Texaco, Inc., 786 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th Cir. 1986); 
Gardino v. Caribbean Lumber Co., 587 F.2d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1979); Durant v. Surety 
Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081, 1088-89 (7th Cir. 1978); Westerman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
577 E2d 873. 882 (5th Cir. 1978). 
148. See, eg., Knight, 786 F.2d at 1298; Shu-Tao Lin, 742 F.2d at 47; Gardino, 587 E2d 
at 206; Durant, 582 F.2d at 1087. 
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remain mute, the defendant can attack the remittitur-reduced 
award.149 The result might be the new trial that the plaintiff sought 
to avoid by agreeing to the remittitur at the trial level150 or a condi- 
tional new trial order by the appellate court, with grant of a new 
trial being conditioned on the plaintiff's refusal to remit an addi- 
tional amount set by the court of appeals.151 In other words, at the 
appellate level the plaint8 can again be asked to relinquish part of 
his verdict or submit to a new trial on some or all issues. 
The question of the power of an appellate court to order a remit- 
titur has plagued the federal judicial system since the remittitur pro- 
cedure was first employed by federal courts.152 In fact, in Blunt v. 
Little,153 Mr. Justice Story was sitting as a circuit court judge when 
he announced his approval of remittitur and ordered the plaint8 to 
remit $500 or submit to a new Federal courts have been 
slow to adopt the procedure,155 and commentators have expressed 
disapproval of appellate remittitur on a variety of grounds, includ- 
ing, difficulty, on the basis of a trial record, of identifying an appro- 
priate case for remittitur,lS6 and calculating the amount to be 
remitted,15' the inequity of giving the defendant another opportu- 
nity to reduce the plaintiff's verdict,158 and the potential seventh 
amendment objection that appellate court judges would be making 
a remote reexamination of an issue decided by a jury.15' This has 
149. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 147-48. 
150. See, e.g., Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(court of appeals orders new trial on damage issue excepting pre-impact pain and suffering 
award rather than accepting remittitur because of prejudicial errors at trial). 
151. See, eg., Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 741 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1984) (district court 
had requried remittitur for part of punitive damage award, court of appeals requires remitti- 
tur of part of compensatory damage award); Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081 
(7th Cir. 1978) (district court had required remittitur of certain elements of compensatory 
damages, court of appeals remands for additional remittitur or new trial). 
152. See Busch, supra note 15, at 550; Hullverson, Remittitur and Other Things, 28 J .  
Mo. B. 81, 98 (Feb. 1972); Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 310-11; Comment, 
Appellate Remittitur, supra note 15, at 644. 
153. 3 F. Cas. 760 (No. 1578) (C.C.A. Mass. 1822). 
154. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
155. See, e.g., Whiteman v. Pitrie, 220 F.2d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1955). Accord Ballard v. 
Forbes, 208 F.2d 883, 888 (1st Cir. 1954); Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576, 586-87 (7th Cir. 
1952); Smith v. Welch, 189 F.2d 832, 837-38 (10th Cir. 1951). 
156. Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 310; Comment, Appellate Remittitur, 
supra note 15, at 643-44. 
157. See Hullverson, supra note 152, at 98 (noting the problems juries and judges face 
when trying to determine the present value of awards designed to compensate for future 
losses). 
158. Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 310. 
159. Id.; Comment, Appellate Remittitur, supra note 15, at 643-44. See also Busch, supra 
note 15, at 550 (suggesting appellate remittitur is neither justified nor necessary for affirming 
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not stopped federal appellate courts from adopting and employing 
the practice in a wide variety of  situation^.'^^ Recognizing the ob- 
jections raised above, some appellate judges apply a more rigorous 
standard to the grant of appellate remittitur than the standard they 
recognize as appropriate for a trial judge.16' Other judges, however, 
do not evidence any sensitivity to their limited role on appeal, hack- 
ing away at jury verdicts (or trial court remittitur-reduced verdicts) 
that they consider exce~sive. '~~ 
If the court of appeals decides that a remittitur should be or- 
dered, the plaintiff is again put to the choice of remittitur or new 
trial on some or all issues.163 If he agrees to appellate remittitur, 
what is left of his verdict is probably safe because of the unlikeli- 
hood that the Supreme Court will entertain the defendant's petition 
for a writ of ~er t i0rar i . l~~ 
Finally, if the trial judge denies the defendant's new trial and/or 
remittitur motions, judgment will be entered on the jury verdict. 
Then both parties would be free to appeal and the defendant could 
seek, and receive, a remittitur at the appellate 1 e ~ e l . l ~ ~  
a verdict. If a verdict is clearly improper, reversal and remand for a new trial on all the issues 
or damages only is appropriate). 
160. See, ag., EnterpriseRef. Co. v. Secter Ref., Inc., 781 E2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1986); Joan 
W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir. 1985); K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'l 
Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1162 (10th Cir. 1985); Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 
821 (I lth Cir. 1985); Everett v. S.H. Parks & Assocs., 697 F.2d 250,253 (8th Cir. 1983). See 
also supra notes 158-59. 
161. In Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191 (1985), the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit stated: 
This court has noted repeatedly that the excessiveness of a verdict is basically an 
issue for the trial court, and that we consider review only in those rare situations 
where we are pressed to conclude that there is a plain injustice, or a monstrous or 
shocking result. 
Id at 197. See, ag., Hansen v. Johns-Mansville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 
1984); Kolb v. Goldring, 694 F.2d 869, 871 (1st Cir. 1982); Warren v. Ford Motor Credit 
Co., 693 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982); Stineman v. Fontbonne College, 664 F.2d 1082, 
1088 (8th Cir. 1981). 
162. See, ag., American Andoco, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 743 F.2d 417, 425 (6th 
Cir. 1984); Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 741 F.2d 87, 93 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
47.14 Acres of Land, 674 E.2d 722,728 (8th Cir. 1982); Kropp v. Ziebarth, 601 E2d 1348, 
1351 (8th Cir. 1979). 
163. See, eg., Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 741 F.2d at 425; Kropp v. Ziebarth, 601 
F.2d at 1355. 
164. Except for its three page, per curiam treatment of the "remittitur under protest" 
issue in Donovan, see supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text, the court has not considered 
remittitur since its dictum in Dimick, see supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text. 
165. Eg., Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 302. 
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Hundreds of recent federal court cases involving remittiturs and 
scores of articles and other secondary sources were consulted in the 
preparation of this Ar t i~1e . l~~  About ten years ago, a flurry of inter- 
est in remittitur arose from the then-current federal court conflict 
concerning whether a plaintiff should be allowed to remit "under 
protest" and then appeal the remittitur order.16' The Supreme 
Court's per curiam opinion in Donovan put an end to the conflict 
when it "reaffirm[ed] the longstanding rule that a plaintiff in federal 
court, whether prosecuting a state or federal cause of action, may 
not appeal from a remittitur order he has accepted."168 The "long 
standing rule" reaffirmed in Donovan was based on four Supreme 
Court decisions, rendered between 1889 and 19 17, 169 which courts 
and commentators felt did not constitute compelling precedent for 
rejection of the "remittitur under protest" pro~edure."~ 
Since this brief flare-up of interest in remittitur, which ended 
shortly after the Donovan case, the Supreme Court has not dealt 
with remittitur practice and commentators have also been silent on 
the subject. The federal courts, however, have been most enthusias- 
tic in their employment of the device (sans the "remittitur under 
protest" protection for plaintiffs), engaging in wholesale, unfettered 
use of remittitur both at the trial and appellate levels.17' While the 
frequency of remittitur's use varies from circuit to circuit, there has 
been an observable proliferation of remittitur cases in recent years. 
This is partly ascribable to remittitur's use in an ever-widening vari- 
ety of cases in which money damages might be awarded and partly 
ascribable to an increase in the number of actions in which remitti- 
tur traditionally has been employed-personal injury suits involving 
pain and suffering and other "incalculable" sorts of damages such 
as loss of services, of consortium, of counsel, of companionship, and 
the like. As constantly improving technology has created new and 
different ways in which ever-increasing numbers of people can suffer 
personal injury and death, medical science has improved apace, in- 
166. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 15 and cases cited supra in notes 3 1, 11 1, 117, 
and 160. 
167. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
168. Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 650 (1977) (per curiam). 
169. Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver 
Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41 (1895); Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U.S. 551 (1894); Kernon v. Gilmer, 
131 U.S. 22 (1889). 
170. See, e.g., Note, Rernittitur Practice, supra note 15, at 313-15; Note, Appealability of 
Judgements, supra note 15, at 1155-61. 
171. See cases cited supra notes 31 and 160. 
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creasing the probability that seriously injured people, people who 
would have died under more primitive conditions, will survive to 
face a life of pain, suffering and diminished capabilities. The prob- 
lem of determining an appropriate measure of damages in such 
cases continues to plague courts and juries, with the frequent result 
that a jury verdict for such intangible losses is considered excessive 
by the trial or appellate court-a candidate for remittitur. 
The remittitur procedure, as employed in federal courts, is un- 
fair and does not achieve the desired ends--economies of time and 
money-which have repeatedly been cited to justify the proce- 
dure.17' In fact, remittitur practice appears to encourage a certain 
type of waste173 and to create circumstances in which the result will 
necessarily be an excessive verdict.174 To determine what corrective 
measures should be employed, one must first evaluate current pro- 
cedure17' and then propose alternative procedures to better achieve 
the underlying purposes of remittitur without the detrimental side 
effects of the current practice.176 
A. Current Remittitur Practice 
As noted above,177 serious doubts have been expressed as to the 
constitutionality of remittitur practice in light of the seventh 
amendment's proscription of reexamination of facts found by a jury 
other than as such reexamination was available at the common law. 
Moreover, the procedure was overruled in England in 1905,178 thus 
requiring that the procedure employed in the United States be ex- 
amined closely on grounds other than constitutionality. Even if a 
comparable procedure for reexamining jury verdicts existed at the 
common law, which would make the use of the procedure by fed- 
eral courts not unconstitutional, the rejection of the procedure in 
England makes one wonder whether the use of the procedure in the 
United States is objectionable for other reasons. Clearly, the Eng- 
lish courts found it to be so. Moreover, without persuasive compa- 
rable procedures in the country from which the federal system 
sprang, compelling reasons should support continuation of the pro- 
cedure, reasons which this writer cannot identify.179 
172. See infra notes 177-247 and accompanying text. 
173. See infra text accompanying notes 182-88. 
174. See infra text accompanying notes 184-88. 
175. See infra notes 177-247 and accompanying text. 
176. See infra notes 248-63 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra notes 56-88 and accompanying text. 
178. Watt v. Watt, App. Cas. 115 (1905). 
179. See infra notes 180-240 and accompanying text. 
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Traditionally, defendants have viewed remittitur as an unfair 
procedure. By ordering a conditional new trial, the trial judge (or 
the appellate judge) recognizes that something went wrong at trial, 
resulting in an excessive verdict. Rather than giving the defendant 
the new trial to which he admittedly would be entitled if remittitur 
practice did not exist, the defendant is told that the judge is going to 
try to "fix" the defective verdict by asking the plaintiff to give up 
that part of the jury verdict which the judge deems to be exces- 
sive.lS0 If the plaintiff agrees to remit, the defendant is deprived of 
the new trial even if the defendant thinks that the reduced verdict is 
still too high or that the problem with the verdict indicates a serious 
defect in the course of the trial itself.lsl 
Remittitur may also be viewed as unfair to the defendant if used 
in a "liquidated amount case."182 If the trial judge can pinpoint the 
error at trial and can calculate the amount of damages included in 
the verdict as a result of the error,lg3 then it is unfair to the defend- 
ant to give the plaintiff the option of forcing a new trial. The de- 
fendant will argue that the plaints should not be permitted to force 
an expensive new trial if the only problem with the jury verdict is 
the inclusion of an inappropriate element of damages which can be 
removed by the judge. 
Finally, the defendant might object to a trial court's grant of a 
partial rather than total conditional (or unconditional) new trial. If 
the new trial order is limited to damages, a plaintiff might be en- 
couraged to seek a new trial and refuse to remit; the plaintiff has the 
assurance that he risks nothing more than the amount of his verdict 
if he opts for a new trial. Moreover, the partial new trial procedure 
might encourage plaintiffs to ask for unrealistically high damages in 
the hope that the jury will give the plaintiff all that he seeks. The 
advantage of this for the plaintiff is the possibility that the trial and 
appellate judges might be unwilling to disturb the jury verdict. If 
the trial judge or appellate judge does find excessiveness, the judge 
will often order a conditional new trial on only the issue of dam- 
ages. If the plaintiff is satisfied with the remittitur-reduced verdict, 
he can agree to remit. If he is dissatisfied, he is not required to risk 
180. See supra notes 101-29 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. The defendant can, of course, ap- 
peal the denial of his new trial motion, see supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text. How- 
ever, the standard employed on that appeal should be stricter than that provided at the trial 
court level, thus, in theory, making it harder to get relief in a court of appeals. See supra 
notes 152-62 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. 
183. See cases cited supra note 117. 
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his verdict but only the measure of damages to be awarded.lS4 If no 
remittitur practice were available and no partial new trial were pos- 
sible, the plaintiff would be constrained to seek realistic damages 
because the only option available to the trial judge upon a finding of 
excessiveness would be to grant a total new trial on all issues. 
A related problem, from the point of view of the defendant (as 
well as the judicial system), is that remittitur and partial new trials 
encourage plaintiffs to engage in improper trial tactics. The plaintiff 
who knows that a remittitur-partial new trial order is a strong possi- 
bility,lg5 will not be averse to "pulling out all of the stops" to get a 
jury verdict because the court is likely to merely slap the plaintiff's 
wrist by asking for remittitur of some of the verdict obtained in a 
trial marred by misconduct such as improper arguments to the 
jurylg6 or requiring that the plaintiff undergo a new trial only on the 
issue of damages.''' Again, if the plaintiff knew at the outset of the 
trial that the judge's only option, upon finding prejudicial error in 
the form of plaintiff misconduct, would be to order a new trial on all 
issues, the plaintiff and his attorney would be encouraged to con- 
duct their case in a more appropriate manner."' Misconduct 
would be too great a risk to take if the possibility of remittitur and 
partial new trial were removed. Thus, from the defendant's point of 
view, remittitur can be used to deprive him of a new trial which he 
deserves, can lead to expensive new trials at the whim of the plain- 
tiff where the defect in the jury verdict could easily be corrected by 
the trial judge, and can actually encourage plaintiffs to seek unreal- 
istically high damages and engage in improper trial tactics. 
The plaintiff also has many reasons for objecting to remittitur 
practice. The plaintiff who has gone through the litigation process 
and emerged victorious with a verdict in hand would like to retain 
his entire verdict. He is told, however, that he must choose between 
a new trial or remitting some of his verdict. For many plaintiffs, 
this essentially amounts to blackmail, with the verdict being held 
hostage. lg9 
184. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
185. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
186. See cases cited supra notes 104-05. 
187. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text. 
188. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text, and infra text accompanying note 
249. 
189. Judge Feinberg argued, in his dissent in Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 536 F.2d 
536, 539 (2d Cir. 1976), a r d ,  429 U.S. 648 (1977): 
When a remittitur is used . . ., the coercive effect upon a plaintiff is very great. 
He is offered a reduced verdict right away. Should he refuse, in order to regain the 
full amount of the verdict he must first undergo the delay and trouble of a second 
Heinonline - -  38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 201 1987-1988 
202 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW pol .  38:157 
For a plaintiff who is old or ill, there is no real choice but to opt 
for remittitur if he hopes to receive the fruits of the verdict during 
his lifetime. Other plaintiffs who are in difficult financial straits- 
for example, those who have suffered disabling injuries and cannot 
support themselves or pay medical expenses--can ill afford to wait 
until the end of another trial to receive financial benefits. Moreover, 
such plaintiffs are not in a position to bear the expense or risk of a 
new trial, even if they feel that the remittitur reduced verdict is un- 
justly small. Finally, attorneys will pressure these plaintiffs to agree 
to remit, partly from a desire to have their fees paid. Very few 
plaintiffs are in the enviable position of not feeling pressured into 
agreeing to the remittitur. If not deterred by added expense and 
time, plaintiffs might still be reluctant to risk another trial, espe- 
cially because second trials often result in smaller verdictslgO or in 
trial, perhaps obtain a lower verdict, and then try to persuade an appellate court 
that the trial judge erred in reducing the first verdict. It should be no surprise that, 
as the majority puts it, "most plaintiffs now accept the remittitur thus necessitating 
a second trial in only a small minority of cases." If this is so, it proves appellant's 
point, which is that the present system deprives him of any real opportunity to 
challenge the judge's use of a remittitur. 
See also Note, Remittitur Practice, supra note 15, at  31 1-13. 
The tortuous process which ensues when a plaintiff refuses to remit, what one commenta- 
tor refers to as "a potentially permanent treadmill, [with plaintifl forever winning jury 
awards only to have them nullified by the court," Comment, Remittitur Review, supra note 
15, at 377-78, is illustrated by some of the cases cited infra notes 190-91. The court in Collins 
v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1976), noted: 
Technically, a rernittitur gives the plaintiff a choice which gives plaintiff the option 
of a new trial. Such an option is really without much significance. An order of 
rernittitur is a judicial determination that the verdict is excessive as a matter of law 
. . . . The reality is that if there is a verdict for the plaintiff upon retrial, it cannot 
from a pratical standpoint, be expected to be sustained in an amount previously 
deemed excessive . . . . 
Id. at 934 (citations omitted). 
190. See, Kazan v. Wolinski, 721 F.2d 911, 912-14 (3d Cir. 1983) (after Trial 1, plaintiff 
refused to remit $90,000 of his $150,000 jury award to bring verdict to $60,000; Trial 2 
resulted in jury award of $50,000; court of appeals found no abuse of discretion in Trial 1 
court's conditional new trial order); Smith v. John Swafford Furniture Co., 614 F.2d 552,553 
(6th Cir. 1980) (after Trial 1, plaintiffs refused to remit amounts necessary to reduce their 
jury awards of $44,797 and $9,000 to $27,500 and $5,000 respectively; Trial 2 resulted in jury 
awards of $16,000 and $0, respectively; court of appeals found no abuse of discretion); Ehret 
Co. v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 523 F.2d 280,283-85 (7th Cir. 1975) (after Trial 1 plaintiff 
refused to remit amount sufficient to reduce his jury award of $546,000 to $408,119.25; Trial 
2 resulted in jury award of $120,000; court of appeals found no abuse of discretion); Reinert- 
sen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., 519 F.2d 531, 532-33 (2d Cir. 1975) (after Trial 1 
plaintiff refused to remit amount sufficient to reduce jury award of $75,000 to $45,000; Trial 2 
resulted in jury award of $16,000; court of appeals found no abuse of discretion); Slatton v. 
Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 506 F.2d 505, 506-09 (8th Cir. 1974) (after Trial 1 plaintiff 
refused to remit amount sufficient to reduce jury award of $85,000 to $50,000; in Trial 2 the 
trial court assessed damages of $19,000 less an offset for workmen's compensation benefits; 
court of appeals found no abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975); Holmes v. 
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the new trial judge again ordering a remittitur or new trial on the 
ground of ex~essiveness.'~~ The unfairness of ordering a remittitur 
after a second trial is particularly apparent-arguably, the second 
judge should defer to the jury since two different juries awarded 
damages greater than trial judges deemed appropriate, leading to 
the obvious conclusion that the jury verdict should not be 
disturbed. 
The plaintiff may also raise the argument that remittitur actu- 
ally encourages trial judges to interfere with the functioning of the 
jury by making relatively minor adjustments to the jury verdict.lg2 
The judge may feel that the damages are not so excessive that he 
would, in good conscience, order a new trial on that basis. He will 
Wack, 464 F.2d 86, 87-89 (10th Cir. 1972) (after Trial 1, plaintiff refused to remit amount 
sufficient to reduce jury award of $15,000 to $5,000; Trial 2 resulted in jury award of $0; 
court of appeals found no abuse of discretion); Cosentino v. Royal Neth. S.S. Co., 389 F.2d 
726, 727 (2d Cir.) (after Trial 1 plaintiff refused to remit amount sufficient to reduce jury 
award of $25,000 to $13,000; Trial 2 resulted in jury award of $1,800; court of appeals found 
no abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968). See also Bruner v. Dunaway, 684 
F.2d 422, 424-27 (6th Cir.) (Trial 1 resulted in $300,000 jury award for plaintiff, trial court 
ordered new trial; Trial 2 resulted in $100,000 award for plaintiff; court of appeals affirmed), 
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1982). But see Dabney v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 761 F.2d 
494, 497-501 (8th Cir.) (Trial 1 resulted in $1,000,000 jury award for plaintiff; court of ap- 
peals ordered new trial for prejudicial errors at trial; Trial 2 resulted in $2,000,000 award for 
plaintiff; court of appeals affirmed), cerf. denied, 106 S.Ct. 233 (1985); Vanskike v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 725 F.2d 1146, 1148-50 (8th Cir. 1984) (Trial 1 resulted in jury award of $903,000, 
trial court ordered new trial on damages; Trial 2 resulted in jury verdict of $1,811,177; court 
of appeals affirmed); Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 929-35 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(Trial 1 resulted in verdict for defendant and trial court ordered new trial because verdict was 
against weight of the evidence; Trial 2 resulted in award of $600,000 for plaintiff; court of 
appeals affirmed). 
191. See, Central Microfilm Serv. Corp. v. Basicflour Corp., 688 F.2d 1206, 1210-22 
(8th Cir. 1982) (Trial 1 resulted in total jury award of $1,094,000 and court ordered new trial; 
Trial 2 resulted in total jury award of $650,000, trial court ordered remittitur down to 
$406,978 and plaintiff refused to remit; on petition for mandamus, court of appeals ordered 
trial court 2 to reinstate second jury verdict), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204 (1982); Ouachita 
Nat'l Bank v. Tosco Corp., 686 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1982), reh'g en banc, 716 F.2d 485,487- 
90 (8th Cir. 1983) (after Trial 1, plaintiffs refused to remit amounts necessary to reduce their 
jury awards of $3,300,000 and $500,000 to $1,312,762.17 and $250,000, respectively; Trial 2 
resulted in a verdict for defendant; court of appeals found that remittitur in Trial 1 might be 
too large and vacated and remanded for reconsideration; court of appeals reconsidered the 
appeal en banc and concluded that the damage award should not have been less than 
$1,808,547.67 and then remanded to the district court); Richardson v. Communication 
Workers of Am., 530 F.2d 126, 128-30 (8th Cir. 1976) (Trial 1 resulted in finding of wrongful 
discharge and damages of $20,000 which was reduced to $1,500 by trial judge, court of ap- 
peals ordered new trial limited to damages; Trial 2 resulted in damages of $92,000 for loss of 
employment and $250,000 for "mental anguish"; district court granted new trial on "mental 
anguish" claim because it found the verdict punitive; Trial 3 resulted in finding for defendant 
on "mental anguish" claim; court of appeals affirmed). 
192. See cases cited supra note 116. 
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feel less constrained about ordering a new trial conditioned on the 
plaintiff's refusal to remit a small amount of his award. The judge 
knows that the plaintiff will probably remit and bring the award 
exactly in line with the amount that the trial judge feels is the "cor- 
rect" verdict. 
The Donovan decisionlg3 has exacerbated the unfair position in 
which the plaintiff perceives himself. According to the Supreme 
Court, the plaintiff, who has benefited from the remittitur by having 
the new trial cancelled, cannot be so ungracious as to appeal the 
trial court's conditional new trial order.lg4 Thus, the remitting 
plaintiff, who probably views himself as a victim of the judicial sys- 
tem because his election to remit rather than suffer a new trial is not 
really voluntary, is forced to remain mute at the appellate level 
while the defendant is free to challenge the denial of his new trial 
motion or to argue that the amount of the remittitur was too 
sma11.1g5 If the court of appeals grants the defendant's motion for a 
new trial, the plaintiff's hard fought battle is lost, and he must sub- 
mit to a new trial.lg6 Moreover, he faces the substantial risk that 
the court of appeals will ask him to remit more of his verdict or 
submit to a new tria1.1g7 
Plaintiffs could also raise legitimate objections to the procedures 
federal courts use in determining when remittitur is appropriate and 
calculating the amount to be remitted. Moreover, the entire federal 
judicial system may be compromised by the remittitur procedure as 
currently employed in many courts. Even if a form of remittitur 
were available at the common law, so that the seventh amendment 
arguments would not prevail to invalidate the entire procedure, the 
"wholesale" remittitur practiced in federal courts seems to exceed 
permissible bounds. Arguably, at the common law, a judge had the 
power to "correct" an excessive jury verdict or to order new trials 
on the ground of e~cessiveness.'~~ His power did not extend, how- 
ever, to substituting his own evaluation of the facts adduced at trial 
for that of the jury. A federal trial judge is not given such power in 
other contexts. He cannot, for example, grant a judgment notwith- 
standing the verdict on the basis of insufficiency of evidence; he 
193. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
195. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text. 
196. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text. 
198. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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must grant a new trial.lg9 When a trial judge orders remittitur on a 
factual rather than legal basis, he is substituting his own evaluation 
of the facts for that of the jury. The plaintiff does, of course, have 
the option to refuse to remit and thus elect a new trial; thus the 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict analogy is not complete. 
When one considers, however, the unrealistic nature of any expecta- 
tion plaintiff will opt for a new trial-most plaintiffs have no real 
choice but to remit-the analogy becomes more apt. 
To assess circumstances in which trial judges (and appellate 
judges) grant remittitur and the procedures they use to determine 
the amounts to be remitted, the cases should be examined by cate- 
gory. Clearly, some of the most astonishing results occur in per- 
sonal injury and wrongfbl death cases in which the jury is required 
to evaluate past and future pain and suffering, as well as future 
financial and personal loss because of the continuing effect of the 
injury. The judge often maintains that, due to his exposure to simi- 
lar personal injury cases, he is well-equipped to determine what 
should be the maximum allowable jury verdict.200 He and his col- 
leagues within a particular circuit have sat on many "lost limb" 
cases, for example, and he will assert that a jury verdict which ex- 
ceeds the largest prior verdict for such a loss is "too large" and 
should be reduced, if not to equal the average of such past ver- 
dicts,201 or the highest of such past verdicts202 then to some "rea- 
sonable" increment above the highest prior verdict (thus allowing 
for some usually undefined "fudge" factor).203 Such a mathemati- 
cal and mechanical approach to evaluation of damages completely 
undercuts the function of the jury which is to decide how much this 
~ ~ ~ p -  
199. See supra note 10. 
200. See generally Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Air 
Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985); Martell v. Boardwalk 
Enter., 748 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1984); Lux v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 608 F. Supp. 98 
(N.D. 111. 1984); Villar v. Wilco Truck Rentals, 627 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. La. 1986); Gaston v. 
Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 487 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Williams v. Ryder Truck 
Lines, 489 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458 
(N.D. Ill. 1984). 
201. See, eg., Martell, 748 F.2d at 740; Williams, 489 F. Supp. at 430; Smith, 608 F. 
Supp. at 458. 
202. See, eg., In re Air Crash, 767 F.2d at 1151; Gaston, 487 F. Supp. at 16. 
203. See, Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[wle believe 
the jury could rationally award damages to Joan above the record $60,000 figure . . . [; 
alccordingly, we hold the damages excessive only to the extent they exceed $75,000); Haley v. 
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 746 F.2d 311, 319 (5th Cir. 1984) ("because] $150,000 ap- 
pears to be a relatively large, if not the largest, damage award for loss of an adult child in 
Louisiana, the maximum that we think a reasonable jury could have awarded . . . was 
$200,000 ($150,000 plus an additional one third)"). 
Heinonline - -  38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 205 1987-1988 
206 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW pol .  38:157 
particular plaintiff has suffered and will suffer in the future because 
of the The judge uses his prior experience to round off the 
corners and adjust the verdict so that it is in line with a judicial 
preconception of what a particular type of injury is worth. The ef- 
fect of this approach is almost the same as if trial judges provided 
juries with "schedules" of allowable ranges of recovery for particu- 
lar types of injuries, much like the schedule provided with most lia- 
bility insurance policies. 
Such an approach clearly usurps the function of the jury. The 
fact that the trial judge has seen, in his years on the bench, human 
misery of different types, might make him a particularly poor candi- 
date for the task of assessing damages in a particular case. Argua- 
bly, after a while, he may become unable to see the cases as 
involving unique individuals but rather as fact situations to be fit 
into a scheme of prior cases. Jury members, on the other hand, do 
not come to a case prejudiced by earlier courtroom experiences but 
rather view the case as a unique event in which they evaluate loss 
based on their own experiences of the real world and their own as- 
sessments of the peculiar circumstances of the plaintiff at bar. On 
the ground that this is the role traditionally ascribed to the 
a trial judge's reassessment based on other cases should not be 
countenanced. 
The arrogance displayed by courts in these types of cases is par- 
ticularly galling. One need review only a couple of cases to be able 
to identify with these feelings.206 In a recent decision in the Fifth 
204. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
205. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text, and infa notes 218-20 and accompa- 
nying text. 
206. See Joan W., 771 F.2d at 1023-25 (civil rights action for recovery for emotional 
damage caused by strip search; court compared verdicts in other cases arising from same 
police procedure and required remittitur down to $75,000, which was $15,000 more than 
largest prior verdict); Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 746 F.2d 31 1, 318-19 (5th Cir. 
1984) (wrongful death action for death of 25 year old son of plaintiffs; court agreed with 
defendant's contention that verdict of $350,000 for each parent was "by far the largest quan- 
tum of damages awarded the parents of an adult offspring in Louisiana jurisprudence" and, 
on the basis of prior decisions, required remittitur down to $200,000 each, one-third higher 
than highest amount previously awarded); Lux v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 608 F. Supp. 
98, 105 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (wrongful death action for death of husband of plaintiff; 
"[clonsidering the evidence at trial and other awards in similar cases, the Court is of the 
opinion that a remittitur of $1,000,000 is appropriate"); Gaston v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 
487 F. Supp. 16, 18-19 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (products liability action involving permanent pa- 
ralysis of plaintiff; court reviewed awards in other similar cases and concluded that the ver- 
dict of $1,250,000 was "out of line with the verdict in other cases . . .[; a] reasonable verdict 
and one in line with other cases . . . would be $1,000,000"); Williams v. Ryder Truck Lines, 
Inc., 489 F. Supp. 430,432 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (personal injury action involving disabilitating 
back injury; the court found it "obvious . . . that the $250,000.00 verdict for Mr. Williams 
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Circuit, for example, In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 
Lo~isiana,~~'  a case in which an aircraft had crashed into the plain- 
tiff's home, killing his wife and three children, and destroying his 
house and its contents, the jury had awarded the plaintiff, inter alia, 
$400,000 for the loss of each child and $1,500,000 for the loss of his 
wife. The District Court had obtained the plaintiff's agreement to a 
remittitur of $500,000 for the loss of his wife. In reviewing the re- 
maining damage award which it found to be excessive, the Court of 
Appeals "examine[d] past awards for similar injuries," "Mar what 
rough guidance they provide."208 The Court of Appeals did allow 
that "simply because certain awards have been afJmed does not 
indicate that these are the highest, or even near the highest, awards 
which might be allowed."209 With no analysis other than notation 
of the results of several recent cases, however, the court 
concluded:210 
We find that $500,000 for the loss of love and Section of the 
wife and $250,000 for the loss of love and affection of each child 
are the maximum amounts which may be awarded in this case. 
We reach this conclusion fust and foremost on the evidence in 
this record, and secondarily on the rough guidance provided by 
awards approved for similar injuries by the Louisiana appellate 
courts and the decisions of this court applying Louisiana law. 
The court did not explain how the "evidence in the record" 
prompted its conclusion that "on the facts of this case, these are the 
[was] out of line with the verdicts and awards in similar cases in this Court"). See also infra 
notes 207-21 and accompanying text. Cf: Coburn v. Browning Arms Co., 565 F. Supp. 742, 
750-52 (W.D. La. 1983) (products liaility case; court downplays "comparison" test in favor of 
determining whether the jury verdict, which was higher than a number of awards in similar 
cases, "[did] not exceed the maximum amount allowable under the evidence adduced at 
trial"). In one recent wrongful death action, the Fifth Circuit refused to disturb a jury ver- 
dict which was the "largest published award for the surviving parents of an adult child," 
concluding that they were "very reluctant to substitute [their] views on damages for those of 
the jury . . . ." Guiterrez v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1985). This case 
demonstrates surprising restraint by the court which seemed so free to interfere with large 
verdicts against airlines, see In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 767 E2d 1151 
(5th Cir. 1985) (described infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text); Haley, 746 F.2d 31 1, 
318-19 (5th Cir. 1984). making one wonder about the source of the inconsistency in ap- 
proach. 
At least one circuit has gone so far as to express regret that no awards in similar cases 
were available for comparison purposes. In Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 296 
(7th Cir. 1979), the judges noted that they "would be more comfortable in deciding the amor- 
phous question before us . . .[in favor of affirming the jury verdict] if other courts had ap- 
proved comparable awards." 
207. 767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985). 
208. Id. at 1156. 
209. Id. (emphasis in original). 
210. Id. at 1157. 
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maximum awards which may be sustained."211 The reader is left to 
guess at the court's analysis. Did the Court of Appeals reduce the 
amounts because the record revealed that the defendant did not love 
his family very much and thus would not suffer too much from their 
loss? Or, on the other hand, did the court believe that, with no 
children to raise by himself, the plaintiff would not suffer the loss of 
his wife too keenly? Did the court reduce the per child damages 
because there were three children, so the plaintiff might have valued 
each less than if he had only one child? Of course, such specula- 
tions seem ghoulish and unfair, but with nothing more to go on 
than conclusory statements that the record will support no more 
than these amounts, any precedential value of the case is reduced to 
merely a recital of maximum allowable amounts to be quoted as 
"rough guidance" by a trial or appellate judge in the next similar 
case. The jury, not having to answer uncomfortable questions like 
those posed above, is better equipped to calculate damages in this 
case. Jurors do not compare the plaintiff here to other people 
whose spouses have died in accidents; jurors decide what damages 
this plaintiff suffered in this tragic event which wiped out his entire 
personal life. Comparisons are inappropriate unless the cases are 
quite comparable, and such identity does not occur.212 
The Second Circuit also engaged in a comparison process as 
part of its analysis in concluding that a $2,000,000 jury verdict for a 
teenage boy who lost an arm in a boating accident was excessive 
and should be reduced to $l,200,000.213 The court noted: 
21 1. Id. (emphasis in orginal). 
212. Judge Tate, in his dissenting opinion, argued: 
In short-hand terms, the fundamental error of the majority is its failure to recog- 
nize that, as a threshold matter, the award of damages is essentially a factual deter- 
mination by the trier of fact under the particularized facts of each c a s e n o t  a 
matter that on appellate review is to be scaled as allowable by a trier of fact only by 
the use of numbers derived from prior appellate approval of awards for losses of 
wives and children that were made under varying factual conditions; not as if the 
loss of a wife or the loss of a child represents some kind of a fungible loss to be 
measured interchangeably, so that the loss of any wife is the same as the loss of any 
other wife under all circumstances. 
Essentially, it is only after an appellate court determines that an award is exces- 
sive under federal standards of appellate review, that utilization of past awards may 
become relevant in determining the amount to which a jury award should be re- 
duced, for remittitur purposes, as the greatest amount awardable under the circum- 
stances. Here, in effect, the majority determines that the present awards for the 
plaintiff's loss of his entire family, his wife and three little boys, is excessivewith- 
out reviewing the particular circumstances of thepresent loss-essentially because it 
is greater than any award found reported in federal or state appellate decisions that 
had approved a particular trial jury's award of lower damages for loss of a wife or a 
child (under circumstances, however, that differ markedly from the present). 
Id. at 1160. 
213. Martell v. Boardwalk Enter., 748 F.2d 740, 754 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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[Tlhe guidance we receive from the recent New York cases is 
that the awards condoned for the loss of a single limb have 
ranged from $325,000 to $810,000. The award to Brent of 
$2,000,000, if designed principally to compensate him for the loss 
of his arm and his other physical injuries must be considered to 
be at least twice as high as what is permissible.214 
In this case the court did compare the facts to other cases, conclud- 
ing that this plaintiff had not suffered such extreme loss as the other 
plaintiffs. Again, however, this rather clinical approach, taken by 
an appellate court which was remote from the trial process in which 
the jury participated and on which it based its decision, seems inap- 
propriate. Either the jury should be able to decide each case on its 
own merits, or trial judges should require the jury to review prior 
cases. In many recent personal injury cases, judges seem to use the 
jury merely to decide questions of liability with the judges deciding 
the questions of unliquidated damages by themselves.215 
Not all judges are willing to use remittitur to reduce jury ver- 
dicts so that the amount awarded is more consistent with the results 
of other similar cases in the jurisdiction. At least one District Court 
granted a new trial on the ground that the excessiveness of the jury 
verdict when compared with other verdicts reflected "undue sympa- 
thy of the jury toward the plaintiff."216 The court, fmding that the 
jury had been improperly biased in favor of the plaintiff, required a 
new trial, concluding that "[ilf a jury verdict results from passion or 
prejudice, the proper remedy is a new trial and not r e m i t t i t ~ r . " ~ ~ ~  
While noting this disagreeable practice by many federal court 
judges, it is only fair to observe that other judges have respected the 
jury as the body with which responsibility for these difficult damage 
decisions should rest. After denying a remittitur in MiIos v. Sea- 
Land Sewice, Inc., Judge Irving Ben Cooper of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York presented 
strong arguments for respecting the unique function of the jury: 
[Wle must take great care to avoid an "unjustified usurpation of 
the function of the jury," especially where clear issues of fact 
appear in the trial record and ample evidence exists to support 
the verdict. 
In the last analysis, we see overwhelming support for the ob- 
servation (in essence) of Mr. Justice Holmes: that the life of the 
law has not been logic; it has been experience. It is exactly that 
"experience" which brought the jury system into its very exist- 
214. Id. at 753. 
215. Id. 
216. Villar v. Wico Truck Rentals, 627 F. Supp. 389, 392 (M.D. La. 1986). 
217. Id. at 392. See ako supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text. 
Heinonline - -  38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 209 1987-1988 
210 CASE WESTERN R ESER VE LAW RE VIEW pol .  38:157 
ence; and it was the jury's "experience" which resulted in the 
verdict herein recorded and now under attack.218 
In a recent case, McDonald v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that 
"[pllacing a value on human suffering is always a subjective enter- 
prise, turning on the jury's sensibilities to the facts and circum- 
stances presented in a particular case."219 Finally, in defense of the 
district court's decision to refuse remittitur from a verdict of 
$19,000,000, the court gave homage to the jury system:220 
It  is not for me to say that a jury's assessment of unliquidated 
damages is wrong because I would have arrived at a different 
figure. Indeed, the constant exposure to death, injury and out- 
rage which confronts judges necessarily jades our vision and im- 
mures our emotions. The genius of the jury system is the 
deliverance of judgment by collective response from members of 
the community who have ordinary experience. 
Unless the Supreme Court steps in to set guidelines for remitti- 
tur cases such as those discussed above,221 the dichotomy in ap- 
proaches will persist, to the detriment of the parties involved in 
litigation and the judicial system as a whole. If the federal courts 
are not permitted to dispense with juries in these cases, the First 
Circuit's sentiments will, indeed, be pertinent-assessment of incal- 
culable, intangible damages is a function best left for the If 
the jury errs and awards damages which would be excessive as a 
matter of law, then a new trial with a properly functioning jury 
should be granted. 
In addition to the objectionable practice of trial and appellate 
judges using the remittitur device to second guess juries in areas in 
which no definite amount or even ballpark figure can be identified 
with any degree of certainty, many judges who base their remittitur 
orders on the "facts of the case" employ a clinical approach which 
is offensive and unjust. Often, complete dissection of a portion of 
the damage award (on the basis of the facts of the case) is coupled 
with a completely conclusory analysis of another aspect of damages. 
The offensiveness of the "clinical approach" lies in the tendency of 
trial and appellate court judges to make inappropriate inferences 
from the facts at trial. The court, for example, might conclude that 
218. 478 F. Supp. 1019, 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New 
Orleans, La., 767 F.2d 1151, 1160 (5th Cir. 1985) (Tate, J., dissenting); supra note 208. 
219. 724 F.2d 243, 247 (1st Cir. 1984). 
220. Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 615 F. Supp. 1546, 1553 (D. Colo. 1985). 
221. See supra notes 199-219 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. 
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a small amount of damages or no damages at all should be awarded 
to a spouse for loss of consortium, affection, companionship, and 
guidance, based not on the fact that the evidence at trial established 
that the spouse did not have an affectionate or physical relationship 
prior to the tragic event in question, rather on the fact that the 
couple was in their later years at the time of the injury.223 While it 
is a reasonable inference that some older couples are less frequently 
physically intimate than some younger couples, it is equally possible 
that dependence on one another for the satisfaction of physical and 
emotional needs can grow during a marriage with the later years 
being the ones in which the spouses are most needful of one an- 
other's companionship as well as physical love. Again, this is not 
the sort of inference that a judge ought to be making; if the facts at 
trial could lead to more than one conclusion as to the value of an 
element of damages, the jury should make the choice. Judges are 
too often influenced by stereotypes of prior decisions to be effective 
in the microscopic examination of a single case where a fair damage 
assessment is essential.224 
Another less than subtle form of age discrimination evidenced 
by judges examining jury verdicts appears in the area of damages 
for pain and suffering, past and future.225 While everyone recog- 
nizes that the life span of an older person is statistically less than 
that of a younger person, leading to the conclusion that the future 
223. In Holman v. Mark Indus., 610 F. Supp. 1195, 1205 @. Md. 1985), a p d ,  796 F.2d 
473 (4th Cir. 1986), a personal injury case involving a 60 year old plaintiff, the court stated: 
Moreover, $180,000 for loss of consortium is likewise grossly excessive. Piain- 
tiffs did not even seek damages for loss or impairment of the sexual relationship 
between plaintiff Holman and his wife, and the jury was expressly instructed not to 
consider this element in deciding upon the amount to be awarded for loss of consor- 
tium. In view of the ages of both plaintiff Holman and his wife, this Court con- 
cludes that on the record here an award in the amount of $180,000 was likewise 
grossly excessive. 
224. See, eg., supra note 206. 
225. In Holman, 610 F. Supp. at 1205, the court concluded that the damage award of 
$1,300,000 for pain and suffering of a 60 year old man was "grossly excessive." The court 
noted: 
In opposing the motion of defendant Patuxent for a partial new trial, plaintiffs 
have cited numerous cases in which substantial awards in excess of $1,000,000 have 
been upheld on appeal. However, almost all of the cases cited by the plaintiffs in- 
volve a plaintiff who was much younger at the time of the injury than plaintiff 
Holman. Indeed, in most of these cases, the plaintiff was a child, a teenager, or a 
person in his 20's or 30's with a much greater life expectancy than J.C. Holman. 
Id. In Dean v. Mitchum-Thayer, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1, 1-2 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), a products 
liability case in which the plainitf contracted mercury poisoning from the defendant's skin 
cream, the court seemed, in part, to base its decision to grant a new trial on the issue of 
damages on the fact that the plaintiff was 84 years old and already suffered from other physi- 
cal ailments. 
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pain and suffering of an older person will probably be of shorter 
duration than that of a younger person, an older person still suffers 
pain. Moreover, older people have reduced physical capabilities in 
terms of recovery and will be condemned to live out their lives with 
little hope of relief from pain and disability. A younger person will 
heal more completely, will possibly benefit from future medical 
breakthroughs, and is usually surrounded by a supportive family 
structure. Often, the older person is alone. Again, the jury seems 
better equipped to evaluate all of these factors in a particular case to 
reach a just result. The court, in ordering a remittitur, usually fo- 
cuses only on the age of the plaintiff, finding that an older plaintiff is 
entitled to a much smaller recovery than a similarly situated 
younger plaintiff.226 These "clinical approach" problems not only 
arise in circumstances involving apparent age discrimination by 
trial judges, but also problems will arise in any circumstance in 
which a judge will have a stereotypical reaction based on a particu- 
lar fact of the case, such as age, sex, social status, educational back- 
ground, or the like. 
A different but no less frustrating approach taken by some 
courts in calculating remittiturs is the "conclusory statement" tech- 
nique. The court will usually outline the facts of the case rather 
carefully and will describe, in detail, the requirements for grant of a 
remittitur and the other circumstances in which the court had made 
such orders. Then, without further discussion, the court will an- 
nounce its conclusion that the verdict is too high and that a certain 
remittitur will reduce the verdict to a permissible Hodges v. 
Keystone Shipping Co. provides a representative sample: 
The Court concludes that the jury verdict was not the result of 
passion or prejudice but is beyond the maximum award sup- 
ported by the evidence. The Court finds that the evidence 
presented could support a maximum award of no more than 
$12,500. The Court therefore grants defendant's motion for new 
trial on the issue of the amount of compensatory damages unless 
plaintiff accepts remittitur of the compensatory damages to 
$12,500.~~~ 
In such cases, the parties and the appellate court have no clue 
226. See supra notes 222 and 224. 
227. See, e.g., Warren v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 693 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982) 
("[c]onsidering all relevant evidence, we conclude that the punitive damages award exceeds 
the [standard and] . . . find $20,000 to be the maximum allowable recovery for punitive 
damages in this case . . . and order a conditional remittitur to that amount"); Hodges v. 
Keystone Shipping Co., 578 F. Supp. 620, 624 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (quoted in text supra note 
225). 
228. 578 F. Supp. 620, 624 (S.D. Tex. 1983). 
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how the court reached its decision. In effect, the trial judge be- 
comes a jury of one, rendering a general verdict, with no responsi- 
bility to explain the basis for this verdict.229 This sets the trial judge 
up as an alternative to the jury, an alternative who might, at any 
time, substitute his own conclusion for that of the jury. 
Another objection that plaintiffs might raise to current use of 
remittitur is the frequency with which the device is used in cases 
involving relatively new causes of action, such as proceedings for 
sexual harrassment, employment discrimination, violation of civil 
rights, and the like.230 It is obvious that, where a right to relief has 
only recently been recognized or adopted, there will be few cases in 
which the right has been vindicated. Thus, damage assessment 
must be created along with the other parameters of the cause of 
action. The courts, however, seem reluctant to allow juries the free- 
dom to formulate damage awards. Instead, the courts freely em- 
ploy remittitur to adjust jury awards downwards, even though 
where there are no prior awards in similar cases the trial judge has 
very little on which to base a remittitur. Again, these awards 
should be left to the jury to determine on the basis of the facts of the 
case and the jury's collective assessment of the damages suffered by 
plaintiff in this new kind of civil wrong. 
Finally, the party who sought the jury trial at the outset of liti- 
gation, as required by Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce- 
d ~ r e , ~ ~ l  can legitimately object to the use of remittitur by the trial 
or appellate courts. In the federal courts in cases in which a trial by 
jury is available, one of the parties must demand a jury trial or the 
case will be tried by a judge without a The party demand- 
229. If a federal judge sits without a jury, the court is required to "find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. . . ." FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). Thus, a trial 
judge who grants a remittitur without sufficiently explaining the steps by which he reached 
the result is "having it both ways"-because of the presence of a jury he is not required to 
comply with Rule 52(a) and explain himself, but because of the power to grant a remittitur he 
can substitue his own evalaution of damages for that of the jury, essentially cutting the jury 
out of the process. 
230. See, ag., Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (remitti- 
tur in suit for violation of civil rights by wrongful arrest); Huebschen v. Department of 
Health &Social Servs., 547 F. Supp. 1168 (W.D. Wis. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 
1167 (7th Cir. 1983) (remittitur in suit for wrongful conception). 
231. Rule 38@) provides: 
@) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right 
by a jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefore in writing at any 
time after the commencement of the action and not later than 10 days after the 
service of the last pleading directed to such issue . . . . 
FED. R. CIV. P. 38 @). 
232. Rule 38(d) provides: 
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ing the jury trial can argue that his demand implied a desire to have 
questions of fact be decided by a jury and not by the trial judge. 
When the trial judge orders a remittitur or new trial, the judge must 
substitute his own evaluation of the evidence-at least he must sub- 
stitute what he thought a properly functioning jury would have 
awarded-for that of the This is not what the party seeking 
a jury trial had in mind; he bore the additional expense and delay of 
the jury trial to reap the benefits of having factual issues decided by 
the jury and not according to what the judge thought the jury ought 
to have found. If the party is the plaintiff, he will argue that the 
amount of the jury verdict should not be disturbed-he asked for a 
jury and this is what the jury awarded him. If the party is the de- 
fendant, he will maintain that he is entitled to a new trial before a 
new jury-he asked that questions of fact be decided by a jury, and 
if this jury made some serious error, then he should be entitled ab- 
solutely to have the question presented to a new jury. As noted 
above,234 in a system in which some trial and appellate judges use 
the remittitur device to run "rough shod" over the jury findings, 
such objections can be supported. The party who opted to have his 
questions presented to a jury should not have those questions de- 
cided by a judge-something he specifically wanted to avoid. 
Aside from the interests of either party, rernittitur can be viewed 
as a procedure which, contrary to the justifications usually given for 
it, encourages waste of judicial time and energy. As noted above,235 
if remittitur is used in a case in which the trial court is convinced, as 
a matter of law, as to the source of error which lead to an improp- 
erly high verdict and as to the amount of the verdict traceable to 
that error, remittitur is a wasteful method for dealing with the er- 
ror. The plaintiff has the option to force a whole new trial even 
though the trial judge would not have questioned the amount of the 
verdict except for the existence of this particular error. If the error 
is plain to all and the amount is identifiable, the plaintiff should not 
be able to force a new trial in order to try to retain an erroneously 
awarded sum. 
Remittitur is also wasteful because a defendant, who has little to 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to serve a demand as required by this rule and 
to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury . . . . 
FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d). 
Rule 39@) provides that "[ilssues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 38 
shall be trial by the court . . .", FED. R. CIV. P. 39@). 
233. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text. 
234. See supra notes 197-214 and accompanying text. 
235. See supra note 117 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 181-82. 
Heinonline - -  38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 214 1987-1988 
19871 REMITTITURS (AND ADDZTURS) 215 
lose by the process, will ask for a remittitur routinely. This wastes 
judicial time by requiring the trial judge to rule on these motions. 
Although the defendant might not want to undergo the expense of a 
new trial himself, especially where the verdict is not outrageously 
large or is even quite reasonable, he bears little risk by asking for a 
remittitur. The trial judge might deny the motion and the defend- 
ant is left where he started. If the trial judge grants a remittitur, it 
is almost a foregone conclusion that the plaintiff will opt for the 
remittitur rather than the new trial.236 In either case, the trial judge 
will be required to rule on the motion and, if he decides to grant a 
remittitur, he will be required to determine the appropriate amount 
of damages. Thus, the system encourages judicial waste by provid- 
ing almost no detriment for a defendant seeking a remittitur. If the 
defendant were required to accept the verdict or submit to a new 
trial, he would be less inclined to challenge the verdict on the 
ground of excessiveness. Thus, challenges would be reduced to 
those cases in which the defendant was convinced of the merits of 
his motion. 
A related source of judicial waste in the remittitur procedure is 
the requirement that the plaintiff consent to r e m i t t i t ~ r . ~ ~ ~  The trial 
judge must spend time in calculating the appropriate verdict, but 
this time will be wasted if the plaintiff opts for a new trial. 
An additional source of judicial waste is the effect, noted above, 
of the current system in encouraging plaintiffs to seek unrealistically 
high damages238 and to engage in improper trial tactics.239 Such 
actions by the plaintiff lead to more post-trial activity in the form of 
remittitur and new trial motions. If the plaintiff were forced to sub- 
mit to a new trial when the jury awarded unrealistically high dam- 
ages, or if the trial process involved plaintiff misconduct, the 
plaintiff would be encouraged to seek only realistic damages and 
conduct the trial in a more appropriate manner. Again, much judi- 
cial time would be saved. 
As noted above, remittitur also encourages trial courts to alter 
jury when, if the only choice available to the courts 
would be to grant a new trial on the ground of excessiveness, the 
court would feel constrained from doing so. The case would have 
236. C j  supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text. 
237. C j  supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. 
238. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
239. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra note 116 and text accompanying note 188. 
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to be rather compelling before a new trial would be ordered. Again, 
judicial waste would be avoided. 
Overall, it is difficult to conclude that remittitur, as currently 
used, is a valuable procedure in the federal courts. Any time and 
effort saved by avoiding new trials is arguably overshadowed by the 
wasteful effects noted above. Moreover, the procedure is perceived 
by each party as unfair and results, in many cases, in a wholesale 
substitution of a trial judge's evaluation of the facts for that of the 
jury. Even if the procedure is constitutional, alternative procedures 
should be adopted in the federal courts. 
Before proposing alternatives, this Article will identify an area 
in which remittitur seems to serve a useful function so that pro- 
posed schemes will provide for that circumstance. In many recent 
cases, federal courts have used remittitur to reduce punitive darn- 
ages to an acceptable level, while attempting to avoid the necessity 
of a new trial.241 Punitive damages are not intended to compensate 
the injured plaintiff for the damages he has suffered; they are in- 
tended to punish the defendant and deter him and others from fu- 
ture wrongful Thus, the measure of damages, unless set 
241. See, e.g., Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1635 
(1986); Dempsey v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 717 F.2d 556 (11th Cir. 1983); Fact Concerts, Inc. 
v. City of Newport, 626 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir.), vacated, 453 U.S. 247 (1980) (on grounds that 
municipality is immune from award of punitive damages); Douglas v. Hustler Magazine, 607 
F. Supp. 816 (N.D. 111. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985) (appellate court noting in 
dicta that the remittance was improper because the financial position of defendant justified 
jury's award), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1489 (1986); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 577 F. Supp. 
318 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 
182 (1985); Alley v. Gubser Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36 (D. Colo. 1983), rev'd, 785 F.2d 849 
(10th Cir.) (evidence insufficient to support award of punitive damages), cert. denied, 107 S. 
Ct. 457 (1986); Walden v. United States Steel Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1443 (N.D. Ala. 1983). 
modified, 759 F.2d 834 (1 lth Cir. 1985); Brinks' Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F. Supp. 403 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983); Anglo-American Gen. Agents v. Jack- 
son Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 83 F.R.D. 41 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. 
Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1976). 
242. In a recent case, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi- 
nois stated the function to be sewed by punitive damages as follows: 
Punitive damages are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private 
fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future 
occurrence . . . . If a jury award exceeds the amount required to serve the two 
objectives of punishment and deterrence, the Court must reject it . . . . Damages 
should not go beyond deterrence and become a windfall. . . . Therefore, it is impor- 
tant that courts exercise control over excessive awards. 
Douglas v. Hustler Magazine, 607 F. Supp. 816, 821 (N.D. 111. 1984) (citations omitted), 
rev'd on othergrounds, 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1489 (1986). A 
district court sitting in Colorado articulated the Tenth Circuit's "formula" for assessing puni- 
tive damages: 
The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and to deter simi- 
lar conduct in the future and by others . . . . Several factors must be taken into 
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by statute, relates to the deterrent effect of such awards. If punitive 
damages are too small, the defendant might find it economically 
reasonable to continue committing the offensive behavior.243 If pu- 
nitive damages are too high, the defendant will be put out of busi- 
n e ~ s . ~ ~ ~  The correct measure of such damages depends on the 
defendant's assets. In many cases courts have required that the 
plaintiff remit part of punitive damage awards to bring such awards 
in line with the defendant's ability to pay. While ability to pay and 
deterrent effects arguably are questions of fact, a judge who finds 
that the punitive damages awarded by a jury far exceed the defend- 
consideration in determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive: 
(1) whether it bears some reasonable relation to the actual damages awarded; (2) the 
degree of malice involved; (3) the gravity of the plaintiff's injury; (4) the desire for 
meaningful punishment. . . . mhere is no precise mathetmatical ratio for determin- 
ing the reasonableness of the punitive damage award. However, it has been held in 
the Tenth Circuit that an award of punitives can be "[s]o extremely disproportional 
that we must assume that the jury acted either with passion or prejudice . . . ." 
Deannore v. Gold, 400 F.2d 887,888 (10th Cu. 1968). In the Dearmore case, a ratio 
of punitive to compensatory damages of 11:l was struck down as being excessive. 
Alley v. Gubser Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36, 40 @. Colo. 1983) (citations omitted), rev'd on 
other grounds, 785 F.2d 849 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 457 (1986). 
243. In finding a $500,000 award for punitive damages not excessive, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Michigan noted this possibility: 
Once it decided that punitive damages should be assessed to punish defendant and 
deter others, the jury could properly consider, as plaintiff argued, the multi-billion- 
dollar financial resources of defendant. . . . The size of an award which is necessary 
to make General Motors Corporation take steps to discharge its legal responsibili- 
ties, rather than be regarded as an inconvenient cost of doing business, is clearly a 
judgment call. 
Rodgers v. Fisher Body Div., Gen'l Motors Corp., 575 F. Supp. 12, 17 (W.D. Mich. 1982) 
(citations omitted), modifid, 739 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1984) (statements concerning the con- 
sideration of defendant's financial resources in fixing the amount of punitive damages, how- 
ever, were proper), cerf. denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985). In a sex harrassment suit, the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia also raised similar considerations in its 
assessment of punitive damages awarded by the jury: 
Punitive damages are allowable to punish defendant for the nature of his conduct 
and as a deterrent to others . . . . The jury could reasonably have believed that, in 
view of the considerable wealth of the defendant corporation, it, and others simi- 
larly situated, would not be motivated to prevent a recurrence of incidents such as 
those shown by the evidence to have occurred in this instance unless a substantial 
verdict was returned. 
Clark v. World Airways, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 305, 310, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
(CCH) 1 31,385, at 18,292 @.D.C. Oct. 24, 1980). 
244. In Hollins v. Powell, the court sought a remittitur of punitive damages against a 
person who had lost his job and was "under severe financial constraint" from $500,000 to 
$2,000 on the following theory: 
We can see neither the justice nor sense in afiirming a verdict which cannot possibly 
be satisfied. The purpose of punitive damages is to punish Powell for outrageous 
conduct, not to drain him of his life's blood. . . . We believe an award of $2,000 
would serve the purpose of punishing Powell for his callous indifference to the 
plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and also satisfy the deterrent purpose of punitive 
damges, over and above that provided by the compensatory damage award. 
773 F.2d 191, 198 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1635 (1986). 
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ant's ability to pay, and orders a remittitur, is acting not as a 
factfinder (assets and ability to pay are facts usually not in dispute) 
but rather as a protector of the legal function to be served by puni- 
tive damages. In other words, while compensatory damages are 
clearly a matter for the jury where the relevant facts are the plain- 
tiff's injuries, punitive damages remain more within the province of 
the judge, with the relevant facts being the defendant's financial 
condition. The law should recognize that the defendant legiti- 
mately can be "wiped out" by compensatory damages245 but should 
not recognize or sanction such effect from punitive dan. ,cs.246 A 
new trial on the basis of excessive punitive damages wi  not result 
in different factfinding-the defendant's wealth, a., objective 
amount, will remain the same. Excessive punitive damages is one 
area in which the trial judge can use the device of remittitur to 
avoid an essentially useless new trial. The jury's factfinding is not 
being overridden; the court is merely correcting damages, which as 
a matter of law are too high.247 However, even this useful and rela- 
tively inoffensive remittitur procedure contains the seeds for judicial 
waste. The plaintiff can combat the use of this device by rejecting 
the remittitur and insisting upon a new trial. Clearly, a better ap- 
proach is required. 
B. Remittitur Reform 
First, as noted additur is probably no less constitu- 
tional than remittitur, and an additur-type procedure should be 
available to plaintss to the same extent that a remittitur-type pro- 
cedure is available to defendants. Any alternative scheme to pres- 
ent conditional new trial practice should include both types of 
procedures. 
This writer has concluded that remittitur, in its present form, 
should be eliminated as a procedural device. Without the availabil- 
ity of remittitur, plaintiffs would be constrained to be more respon- 
sible in their original requests for damages and in the conduct of 
their trials.249 A plaintiff would know that if he sought excessive 
damages and the jury awarded the damages sought, the trial court 
would have to grant a new trial upon finding the damage award 
245. Compensatory damages depend on the amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff 
for his injuries. The defendant's ability to pay should not be relevant to this inquiry. 
246. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text. 
247. See cases cited supra note 241. 
248. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra text accompanying notes 237-39. 
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excessive. The plaintiff would be forced to consider carefully the 
appropriate measure of damages to which he is entitled. If the un- 
availability of remittitur were coupled with a refusal to grant partial 
new trials on damage issues alone, plaintiffs would soon learn that 
excessive greed will result only in a waste of money, time and effort 
on a new trial. The plaintiff also runs the risk that a second jury 
will find for the defendant rather than him. With the result, being 
more reasonable demands for relief, the federal judicial system 
would be greatly relieved of the unreasonable, escalating damage 
demands now being requested in a large percentage of our jury tri- 
als. Moreover, fewer trials would result in excessive damage 
awards, thus necessitating fewer new trials and new trial motions, 
and relieving the federal system of the burden of these additional 
trials and motions. 
Without remittitur, and without partial new trial, the plaintiff 
would learn that inflammatory trial tactics designed to maximize 
the amount awarded by the jury and performed in flagrant disre- 
gard for the appropriate conduct of a civil case would result in a 
new trial rather than an inflated jury verdict which could then be 
reduced by the trial judge using remittitur when necessary.250 
Again, the plaintiff who engaged in such tactics would be putting 
his entire verdict at risk. Not only would the trial process become 
more orderly and proper, but the occasion for prejudicial error at 
trial would be reduced. 
Elimination of current remittitur practice would also serve the 
salutary function of checking trial and appellate courts in their un- 
fettered tampering with jury verdicts.251 With the grant of a new 
trial (the only option if the trial court found the jury verdict exces- 
sive) judges would not second guess the jury unless the verdict were 
truly excessive. Whereas some trial judges have no compunction 
about seeking a remittitur of ten or Mteen percentzs2 (a circum- 
stance in which the plaintiff will almost certainly remit rather than 
submit to a new trial), they probably would not grant an uncondi- 
tional new trial in the same circumstances. Thus, new trials would 
be limited to cases in which damages were clearly excessive and a 
lot of "tinkering" with jury verdicts by trial and appellate courts 
would be eliminated. Judicial time would be saved because the 
courts would not have to calculate remittiturs and enter remittitur 
orders and new trials would occur only in the more extreme cases. 
250. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. 
251. See supra notes 197-233 and accompanying text. 
252. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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Moreover, the judge would not be substituting his own opinion for 
that of the jury. 
Trial and appellate judges also would not be engaging in whole- 
sale reexamination of jury verdicts. Where the verdict is clearly ex- 
cessive, a new trial with a new jury would be allowed. The judge 
would not be required to spend time calculating the exact amount 
of the excessiveness. Much of the chaotic state of the law, occa- 
sioned by the varying standards applied by courts, would be mini- 
mized. Moreover, any problem of the judge substituting his own 
factual evaluation for that of the jury would be eliminated.253 
Clearly, the judge would be unable to save a jury verdict by "lop- 
ping off the excrescence." In cases in which the verdict is clearly 
excessive and the source of error is unidentifiable, however, strong 
arguments have always been made that the defendant should be en- 
titled to a new 
Elimination of remittitur would also provide a more balanced 
appeals process. If the trial judge denied the defendant's motion for 
a new trial on the ground of excessiveness, the defendant could im- 
mediately appeal that denial and the plaintiff could defend his 
award. If the trial judge granted a new trial because of an excessive 
verdict, neither party could appeal until the end of the new trial. 
Thus, the inequitable situation created by the Donovan case in 
which the remitting plaintiff was not being permitted to appeal 
would be eliminated.255 
Finally, both parties would probably feel more fairly treated. If 
the defendant were told that the judge could not support the verdict 
because it was too high, he would be granted a new trial. The plain- 
tiff, on the other hand, would not be faced with the difficult choice 
of a reduced verdict or new trial-no real choice for many plaintiffs. 
The plaintiff who prefered to avoid a new trial would know that 
new trial orders would not be granted unless it was clearly 
warranted. 
Elimination of current remittitur practice would not necessarily 
mean that every case in which the jury verdict was found excessive 
would lead to a new trial. A suggested alternative would be that 
subsequent to the finding of excessiveness, the parties be given the 
option to agree on a smaller verdict-a form of post-trial settle- 
ment. The parties could determine what amount would be fair 
253. See supra notes 197-233 and accompanying text. 
254. See supra notes 101-29 and accompanying text. 
255. See supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text. 
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without relying on suggestions from the trial judge (thus avoiding 
the time required to make that evaluation). The trial judge would 
have the option to review the new verdict, but he would not be re- 
quired to do so, because, if both parties have agreed to the amount, 
neither would be in a position to enter a motion for a new trial. 
This procedure would be useful if both parties wished to avoid the 
expense and delay of a new trial. Moreover, the new verdict could 
not be viewed as a substitution of the judge's fact-finding for that of 
the jury. 
Such a procedure could also be made available in an additur- 
type situation in which the trial judge grants a new trial on the 
grounds of inadequacy of the jury Instead of being 
forced to submit to a new trial, as is now the case because additur is 
not permitted in federal courts,257 the parties could agree to an in- 
creased verdict and avoid a new trial. 
Elimination of current remittitur practice would not mean that 
a "liquidated amount case" would have to be submitted to a new 
Under Rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the trial court has the power, when it has sought from the jury a 
general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories, to enter 
judgment in accordance with the answers to the interrogatories 
"[wlhen the answers are consistent with each other but one or more 
is inconsistent with the general verdict . . . ."259 Moreover, the trial 
judge has always had the power to "mold" the jury's verdict in con- 
formity with the jury's findings and to correct obvious errors in the 
verdict itself.260 Thus, if the trial judge is certain that there is an 
error in the jury verdict and can readily determine the amount of 
money which is traceable to that error, he should have the power to 
correct the verdict without remittitur or additur. Conversely, the 
plaintiff should not have the power to force a new trial if the error 
in the jury verdict can be identified and rectified.261 Trial judges 
should be encouraged to seek special verdicts or general verdicts 
with interrogatories in order to identify and correct calculable jury 
errors and avoid unnecessary new trials. 
Punitive damages could be handled in several ways; they could 
256. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
257. See supra notes 56-90 and accompanying text. 
258. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 127; notes 
130 and 132 and accompanying text; and text accompanying notes 181-82. 
259. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b). 
260. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text. 
261. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82. 
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be treated as "liquidated amount cases" with the trial judge setting 
the amount of damages.262 Or perhaps it would be more satisfac- 
tory to view the measure of punitive damages as a question of law to 
be resolved by the trial judge based on the jury's findings on the 
amount of the defendant's assets, his ability to pay and his prior 
record as an offender.263 Punitive damages calculations also could 
be handled by a formula determined by the courts or by Congress. 
An alternative to the total elimination of remittitur practice 
would be to allow trial judges, at the time of submitting a case to 
the jury, to suggest upper and lower limits of permissible verdicts. 
This procedure, however, would require a tremendous effort on the 
part of the trial judge as he would have to assess each case before 
submitting it to the jury. Moreover, it might seriously compromise 
the function of the jury by giving them "ball park" figures. 
Any attempt to standardize the remittitur procedure would be 
so difficult and would so seriously undermine the function of the 
jury that one would have to conclude that the work of the jury 
should be left to the jury, and that when the process misfires, a new 
trial should be granted. After all, because of the unavailability of 
additur in federal courts, the federal courts have been following the 
new trial procedures outlined above, and the system has not 
collapsed. 
262. See supra notes 240-46 and accompanying text. 
263. Id. 
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